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PREFACE
"Entia non multiplicanda sine necessltate."
razor 1. a8 old as reason Itselt.
whlch Is not useful or purpos.ful.

Ockham t •

No work should be undertaken
It might b. good, theretor.,

to Indlcat. the acope ot thia the.l..

Th. purpose ot thia th•• l.

1. to .xamin. and expound the doctrine ot st. Thomas conc.rning
the passlon .adn....

A. a philo.ophical work, this thesIs will

inve.tlgate the ultlmate caua •• ot aadne.a according to St. Thomas.

Thus this work will glve St. Thomas' teaching on the es-

senoe ot sadness, Ita extrinsic causes, and Its ettects.

FInally,

the thesls wll1 state the ultimate causes according to St. Thomas
tor the goodness or mallce ot sadness.
Sadness ls a cammon word in the Engllsh language; it
ls also a common experience.

At times sadn.ss can even reach

A thorough knowledge ot such a basic emo-

serious proportlons.

tlon can certaInly be usetul.
In philosoPQJ, knowledge ot the passlons is ot dlrect
Interest and lmportanc_ to the tleld ot psycholo81.

Psychology

studles the ultlmate cause ot 11te in man, tha human soul; and
all emotlons or passions are immanent operations ot the soul.
This thesis Is also

~t

Interest to ethics.
1

The ulttaate causes

2

tor the goodne •• or mallce of .adne•• wll1 be inve.tlgated in
this work.

Moreover, frequently the influence ot ..otion must

be considered to determine the morallty ot other acts.
maa himselt devotes tlve questions of the Summa
sive17 to the passIon sadnesa.

St. Tho-

Theoloila~

exclu-

At the same time on17 one ques-

tion apiece ls a1loted to such important mattera aa the existenoe

at God and the nature of truth.
as

Thia would Indicate that, a8 tar

st. Thomas ls conoerned, sadness 1s at least ot 80me tmportan
Sadness, then, i8 ot aome intereat and importance In

Itaelt.

It la an emotlon whlch haa been dlscussed

by

philoso-

pher8 trom the tlme ot Ariatotle and the anclent Stoics down to
the present day.

The al. ot thll theail, however, is to examine

-

and expound st. Thomas' doctrine concernlng the passion sadness.
10 one today questions the value ot a thorouib knowledge ot St.

Thomas.

The Angellc Doctor 11 recognlzed as the outstanding

Catholio philosopher.

ADJ studT ot hl. doctrine wlll be uaetul

to philo8oph¥.
To date there has been no lengtAJ treatment on ladnes8
aa such acoordlng to St. Thoma..

A number ot author8, auch aa

Fr. LindworaJq and Fr. Moor., have treated the paa810ns in gen-

eral.

'fh.oma.· Hoore'. PJna!1c PSlcholoQ .pends 80me time on depression, which 1s • type ot .adn•••• l 10 attempt ls made, how-

1 Thoma.
1926, 189-198.

Verne~

Moore, Br9amlc PSlcholoil, Chlcago,

.3
ever, to explain what St. '1"hOlUa teaoh•• on the subject.

JOM

L1n4woralq treat. or the "otlona, or covae J but he takea aod-

ern authors and tiD41ng. a. 1'11. polnt ot departure.

In Emotlona
•

and Morale
.f Fr. Patrick O'Brien diacuaae. the morality ot

~

in.

pas-

alen. 1n general an4 continue. with an extended treatment ot two
partlcular eaotlcma. anger and tear.

hoWever, he doe. not discus..

The morallt., ot a.dn8a.,

Cla•• lo oOllJllentator. auoh u Caje-

tan and JobD ot st. fbo. . . oOlilSment 411'eotly on the text ot st.

Thomaa.

.e.ert1'1ele•• ,

t~l

paaa over .everal articl•• on aadne ••

ana do not s1 ve a COfttlt\uoua, a1ate. .tl0 tl'e.tment.
IlIUQ'

ment ot

.a4De...

But no work 811'•• aD7 long, apeclall.ed tre.tAnd when .adne••

ia tPeated, no attempt la made

to illterpl'et aDd. expoUD4 the text ot
Ilann.er.

'briet,

Several have ori.t di.eu.-

author. tHat ot the e.oilena.

.lou or .aclJle...

~In

at. TboJaaa In a con'iauoua

Thu8 tbe" 1. room. an4 n ••4 tor a more detalleel and moPe

a1.,...tl0 textual study ot Tbo... ' dootrine on .adne•••
!be prinoipal p....ag.. In wbleb St. 'fb.orau t ., dootrin. on

aadn••• 18 expounded

aN tb.e

f\!.UIIIItt;

fbeoloa1ae. I-II, que.tiona 22-

2S and 3S-l9, &ad the J2!. Veritate, qu•• tlona 22, 2S, ad 26.

tAi. the.l. tbe.. pa••ag.. will b. interpreted

tl~.t

In

ot all tram

the immediate context and from the alm and rOPee of the al"gwaant.

Where nec•• sary or poa.lbl., tbe•• texts vll1 be interpreted and
explained by other texts supplied by St. Thou_ hi.elt Which

4
treat of the saae topic or ot the elements contained in the pasaages giying express discussion or sadness.

Brier treatment. by

classic ocmaentatora on St. Thomas and by modern Thomlsta will be
used trom time to time.

They will not be used conatantly, first

ot all because their discusaions do not oover all the portion. at
the text.

Moveover. the aim at this thesis 1. to set torth

~

doctrine. Thus this work will trJ to avoid getting Thoma.'
-mas
doctrine tram aecondary aourc •• rather
from st. Thomas
f

h1l1.

tban

selt.
The purpoae ot the theals has been atated.
Thomas' purpo.e In treating ot aadn••• ,

What 1. St.

A treatm.nt ot aadneaa

tlnd. Its way into the Summa Theologia. because It Is an act ot
The purpose ·ot the Summa la to treat ot God aa the tirat
cau.e and laat end ot all thlnga, •• peclally ot man. 2 Therefore,

man.

St. ThORas treats ot the way In which a rational oreature mu.t
tend toward God.

Man arrives at his la.t end by performing cer-

tain acta, and ao St. Thomaa examines all human acta to discover
whioh acta will help man toward his end and which will hinder
him.

Some acts are proper to man, other acts he shares with

other milla1..

The passions at the soul belong to the last cate-

2 S.T., I. 2, 1, Summa Theologlae, Marlettl ed.,
Taurlnl-Romae; ~950.

5
gOry.)

More effort is required to discern how a treatment ot the

paSSions found its way into the

B! Veritate, which by its title

Is a disousslon ot the true, not of the good.
close connectlon can be found.
Is also pract10al truth.

However, a rather

Besides speoulative truth there

In the judgment of the praotioal Intel-

leot a tree ohoioe is often involved.

Slnoe often the wll1 free-

ly accepts a particular good, frequently the practical intellect
does not operate without the harmonious concurrence of the will.
But the will is influenced by the sense appetltes and their emotiona and passions.

In order, then, to understand praotlcal

truth, a knowledge of the operations of both intellectual and
sitive

se~

appetIt~ muat be had. 4
•

Since this is a philosophioal work, thls thesls will
preacind oompletely tram any theological aspects of the subjeot.
Thua no us. will b. made ot Thomas' appeals to scrlptual authorIty.

This procedure is possible because even though St. Thomas'

ultimate goal may be a theological disoussion, he does make muoh
use ot rational arguments and strictly philosophical considerationa.

-Confer Thomas Aquinas, Truth, trans. Robert W.

3 S.T., I-II, 6, 1.

4

Schmidt, 8.J., Henry Regnery Company, ChIcago, 1954. vi.

CHAPTER I

WHAT IS A PASSION?
No one would be surprised if he were told that love 1s
a passion.

Some eyebrows might be raised, however, if it was an-

nounced that aadness is a passion.
Thomas affirms.

Yet this 1s exactly what St.

In tact, Thomas asserts that sadness is more

strictly a passion than love is.

Because this statement will be

quite easily accepted as soon as the aeaning of paSSion i. explained, a clear and accurate definition of passion will be the
ork

o~

the first chapter.

No attempt will be made here to give

an exhaustive treatment of the passions in general.
is primarily concerned with sadness.

This thesis

Sadness is a passion and

annat be understood as long as the notion of passion i8 not clear.
e can hardly have a clear notion of the specie. as long as he is
ontused concerning the genua.

on the other hand, the first in-

erest ot the present work is the species, and a definition of
is developed only to arrive at a detinItion of sadness.
The ••dern reader finds the word passion used to describe some violent ••otion or a deep-seated,
to same particular species of emotion.

6

pe~anent

tendency

Today a passion usually

7

means an intense reeling or emotion or a strong predilection tor
a particular object.

The Latin word ea88io u.ed by St. Thomas

had a much broader meaning.

Baslcally, Eassio means being pas-

sive, undergoing, or being acted upon.
te~,

Passio i. such a pregnant

however, that it can be translated by such varied expres-

sions as "8uttering,1f "receiving," "exper1encing," "emotion," or
tinally the Engli8h word "passlon."

Desp1te the tact that Raa-

..!.!.2a uauallT has a much narrower meaning than iassio I this theSi8 will translate St. Thomas' ea8sio by eas8ion.

Passion 1.

sttll used in English in a philosophioal sense to denote a being
affected or acted upon by external agents; 1 and, as the theais
progresses, the Eng11sh word will acquire tor the reader the
fuller meaning of the Latin word.
St. Thomas tells us that the Latin word 2as8io come.

trom the Greek word patIn. 2
rer to

7T' eX.. 6)

The

c (' v, a torm ot

Latin letters patIn probable re-

7Toi

tr

Y

LU,

which .eana what St.

Thomas saT8 it me&ns, to receive, be atfected, or to'sufter.

Therefore, a passion is so named because it is the result ot an
agent extrinslc to the subject ot the passion.
1 For the English meanings ot paSSion see Webster's
New International DictlonArl, G. & C. MerrIam Co., Sprlng?Ie1a,
Mass:', 1950, 1781. '

2 De Ver., 26, 1 0, Quaestiones Disputatae, ed. R. M.
Splazzi, TaurIni-Romae, 1949, Vbl. I.

8
Several passages develop one of the characteristic
notes of passlon, passivity.

The subject ot the passion or the

pat1ent is drawn passively toward the agent.)

When a steak is

placed betore a hungry man, he is immedlately attracted toward
the steak.

The-steak has a magic power that pulls the appetlte

ot the hungry man toward it even though the man be a Catholic and
the day be a FJ:llday.

The inner passion that the man undergoes is

an ettect ot the agent, the ateak. 4 When the movement ot the appetite toward the steak is considered as arising trom an external agent, it 18 naturall,. called a pas.ion. S
The agent ot a passion of the soul has three functions
as It attraots or repels the patient.
agent

p.rto~8

The first task that the

is to make the patient well-disposed toward it.

It the agent 1s a good, it causes the patient to be inclined
toward it.

If the agent or object is not yet possessed, it alao

cause. a movement ot this well-disposed patient toward it.

Th1.

second movement is toward the actual posses8ion of the de.ired
object.

The third function ot the agent 1s to cause the patlent

to rest wlth the object once the patlent haa obtained It.

--

3 S.T., I-II, 22, 2 c.

-

4 Ibld., 26, 2 c.
5 ~., I, 41, 1
6

-Ibld. ,

ad

2.

I-II, 23, 4- c.

O Later

9

we shall see how this threetold tunction ot the agent ditferentiates the pa.slona.

The present conoern ls to show the In-

fluence the agent exerta over the patient.
Beaide. pas.l0, two other Latln worda are used to denote a passion, afteotio and perturbatio. 7 Attectio retaina the
note of being acted upon b,. another.

Perturbatio baa the addi-

tional implication ot being afrected adver.ely, being dlsturbed
or changed trom one'a u8ua1 di.p•• ition,
All these de.criptions of a pas.ion whioh bave been
glven are a preparation tor a real, .sseQtlal definition.

But

before the strict deflnition of a passion 1s considered, the wide

In a broad use ot the word,
8
an,. receptlon whatsoever can be called a pas.lon.
In this wide

use .r the word

be recognized.

~t

aenae, 8.f17 creature which baa potenc,. and can be pertected can
experience a passlon. 9

In thi. sense, eati is equlvalent to per-

tlei.
creature whleh
thl. kind of passlon need not lo.e a
-torm
which It had previousl,.. In
general wa,., the all' ls pashas

A

a

slve when It i8 11t up.
ing 1s taken from it.

10

The air recelve. a perfection, but noth-

Arr1 reader ot at. Thomas 1. tam.111ar

--

7 S.T., I-II, 22, Sed Contra.

8 De Ver., 26, .3 CJ see also In II De Antma, 11,
nne 36$, 366, il."PIrotta, 3rd ed., Turln-;-1948:-

---

9 De Ver., 26, 1 c.
10

S.T"

I-II, 22, 1 c.

10
with the statement tntellisere !!! 5uoddam pati.

However, cog-

nition is not a passion in the .trict sense, tor no torm i. lost
In cognl~ion.11

In the strict sense passion implies the loss ot

torm when a new form is gained.

a contrary

Once the wide use of the word as anr reception whatsoever is recognized, our attention can turn to a real, essentIal
detinition which will give us the proper use at paslion as applied to a paSSion ot the .oul.
a detinition.

St. John Damascene give. us such

"Pas.io est motua appetltivae vlrtuti. senalblli.

in illlaglnatlone})tn1 vel mall.,,12 This de.tlnltlon is accepted by
st. Thomas

and

will be our staJ'lting point.

However, what thia

detinition meant to St. Thomas needs a detailed explanation before a clear, preCise concept ot passion will result.
The word motus used in Damascene's detinitlon could reter to

m~

difterent kinds ot movement. or changea.

ot change ia involved here in a pas.ion?
here ia certainly not generation.

What kind

The motion spoken ot

Since a change il alway I trom

lomething to som.ething else, motion 1s alva,.s between contraries.
It there ia no common element in the change, there 1. no change.
This meana that there must be a terminus !. Suo in change.

n. 676.

11

Gener-

ct.!2!. !!!,., 26, 3, ad 171 l!! III Q!. Anima, 7,

11

ation is called a movement only 1n a

wid.~

sense because ot prtme

matter, wh1ch is the common element 1n generat1on.

But absolutely

speaking, prtme matter is not a being. Thus there is really nothing trom which generation begins. 13 Bealdes, generat10n ls a substantlal change.

Obv1ously, a man does not change substantially

when he undergoes a passlon.
Clearll, no local motion 18 involved in a passion.

In

general, a passion 18 the reception ot a tora.

But place 1s somethIng whioh 1s extrinsic to that which ls moved. 14 According to

st. Thomas, nothing ia received in the subject In local motion.
"Nam in motu locali non recipitur aliquid immobile, sed IpSUM

~obile reclpitur In a1iquo 1000."15
The motion ot a passion i. an alteration, a change in
~he

11ne ot qualltl.

~ore,

All change Is between oontraries.

There.

when there Is change in the proper sense ot the word, a

~orm

Is reoeived in the patient which is contrary to the torm
16
~h1ch Is lost.
Thus an alteration take. place when a sun~atner

became. tan and lo.e. hIs normal color.

16

1!! II .f?!

...,An
.....
i1.....,_ma-., 11, n. 36.$.

In the strictest

12

sense, a passlon occurs onlY when a torm natural to the subject
ls lost, and an adverse quallty ls introduced.

When a man sut-

ters adversely by loslng his health and becomlng slck, he Is undergoing a passion in the striotest use ot the word. 11 Bowever,
a man can experlence a passio.n In a less striot sense by loslng
a torm whioh ls not natural tor him.

When a m.an casta ott hls

slcknes. and bec01I1es well, the change that take. place in him is
still oalled a passion.

It is not a passion 1n the strictest

senae because a passlon Implles that the agent has scored a vlctory over the patlent.

And, as st. Thomas puts it, "ODIne autem

quod vIncltur, quasi trahltur extra
minos allenos.,,18

te~os

proprios ad ter-

Thus, properly speaking, the recept10n tn-

volved 1n a passlon must be accompanied by the loss ot the opposite torm.

A

passion cannot be any receptlon whatsoever.

In

the strictest sense, however, this opposite torm must be a quality natural to the subjectJ and tne torm which 1s received must
be an adverse quality.

Sinoe this reception and lo.s ot contrary

torms i8 proper to an alteration, the motus ot Damascenets detin1tion must be reduoed to a qualltatlve ohange.
The motus in question seems to be a complex being.
der which one ot the ten predicamentl would it be 01alsitled1

--

&1 S.T., I-II, 22, 1 o.
18

-In III -Sent.,

15, 2, 1, 1.

Un-

13
Prom the point at

We have just 8een that a passion ia a qualit7.
view ot the agent, a movement ls alao an action.
ment in a

~as.ion

Is the move-

an actlon, a passion, a quality, or all three,

Actually the one act at movement belong. both to the agent and to
the patient.

!he aun's ray. wither a flower.

thered br the aunta ray..

A flower Is wi-

Here i. one and the same act.

It the

movement 1. considered a. ari8ing tram the sun'. rar., it i. an
action.

When the sun'. ra78 wither a tlower, an action occurs.

It the motion is con.idered a8 received In that which is moved,
it i. a passion.

19

a passion occurs.

When a tlower is withered by the sunts rays,

Thus there 1s really only one act. There .eem

to be two acta only because the one act can be considered tram
two d1fterent angle..

20

Motion, Itself, 18 a unique being.

Be-

tore the motion starts, the being 1n motion 1s completely in potency to the motion.

After the motion stops, the being in motion

i. caspletelr in act in respect to the motion.

While the motion

is actually occurring, the being in motion is no longer Completely in potency for the motion has .tarted.

Bar i. it com-

pletely in act, for the motion haa not yet reaehed it. term1nua.

--

19 S.T., I,

41, 1 ad 2.

20 "Sic enim id.m actus .ecundum rem, est duorua secundum diveream rationem; agentis quidem, secundum quod est aD
eot patienti. aute., .ecundum quod est in ipso." ~ III !!l!.,
5, n. 10.

14
Motion, theretore, i8 an act but an impertect act. 2l

Motion can-

not be put into the same clasa aa other beings which are pertect
acta.

However, the kind ot motion can be deaignated by consid-

ering the terminus toward which the motion tends.

Alteration is

really not a qualitl, but is classed as a qua1itl because the
term ot its mov..ent is a qualitl.22

In this w&1 the impertect

act which is motus can be looked upon as an act, a paSSion, and
a quality.
The concept which has been presented ot motus applies
to &OJ passion.

The predicament passion has one essential note,

that the motion in that which is moved be considered as arising
trom an extrinsic agent.
change is a passion.

When water is heated by t1re, the

In thia example, the motion is considered

as aris1ng trom a cause extrinsic to the patient.

But St. John

DamasQene 1s not Mdet1n1ng the pas.ions ot 1nanimate things nor
even ot plants.

Damascene 1. detin1ng a pass10n ot the soul.

21 "Cum entm aqua est solum in potentia calida, nondum movetur: cua vero est ja. caletacta, terminatus est motus
caletaction1.: cum verO jam participat aliquod de cal ore sed
impertecte, tunc movetur ad calorem: nam. quod caletit paulatim
participat calore., magi. ac magis. Ipse 19itur actus impertectUB caloris in oaletactibili eXistens, est motus." In III ~~~.,
2, n. 3J see also In I De Anima, 6, n. 82, In I De Anima, l~
n. 160; .......
In II ......
De AiiI':m.a,-rO, n. 356; .....In III 158 AnIia, 12, n. 766.

.....

22 "Qui1ibet motus est in eodem genere cua suo terminol non qui de. ita quod motus qui est ad qualitate., sit specie. qualitatis: s.d per reductionem." ~ V !e[!., 3. n. 2.

15
Immedlately a
reoeption ot one

~orm

dl~~loulty

arlses.

In an alteration, the

means the 10s8 of a contrary torm.

in the striot sense is between contraries.

Corporeal and ma-

terial beings 10.8 old tor.ma when they aoquire new torms.
water is heated, tor example, it lose. ita coldness.

.

soul i. immaterial.

When

But the

Immaterial beinga do not lose their own form

when the,. acquire a new one. 23

In cognition, a man can see the

green gra.s and still retain his own ¥hi teness •
what a <log is without reallJ being one.
an immaterial soul?

Motus

A man

can know

Can motion take place in

Th8 soul does not gradually lose old torma

and acquire new ones.

The ditflculty oould be solved by call1ng a passlon ot
4

the soul a wide use of the word passion.

The wide use of passlon

which doe. applY' to cognition bas alreadl been mentioned.

When

passion is used widely, the reoeption of a new form take. place
without the loss ot an old one.

But Thomas insists that motion

i. use. properly when it i. applied to a pas.ion

o~

the .oul.

"In appetitu yero sen.itivo propria invenitur motu., et secundum
alteratione. et seoundum motum 100alem."24 The Angelic Doctor
goe. on to explain that a man will move from place to place to
get the objeot ot his passion.

23

24

S.T., I, 14, 1 o.
-!!! B! _An_1m;;;;;;,;.;.a,
I

Passion will al.o cau.e a .trict

10, n. 158.

16
qualitative change in a man.

According to st.

is angrr, his ve'1!1 blood begins to boil.

~homas

when a man

Thus, because ot the

accompanying bodily change, t he soul can experience a passion.
The last statement would indicate that a physical
change i. a neoessarr ingredient in the detinition ot passion}
and as he interprets Aristotle, St. Thomas soon atfinaa that such
is the case.

An essential definit10n must include both the torm

and the utter.
venge.

Sometimes anger is defined .s a d••.ire for re-

The latter detinition gives only the torm.

Somet1me. an-

gel' is detined as a heating of the blood around the heart.
detinition inoludes only the matter.
quate.

This

leither definition is ade-

Since passiona ot the soul are acts otboth soul and

body. the bodi11 ohange must be inoluded in the detinitian. 25
Experience teaohes that bodily change. do accompan, the
passions.

Besides the change involved in anger, St. Thoma. give.

a vivlddascription ot the b04i11 ohange that takes plaoe in tear.
The heart contracts and beoome. oold.
beoomes pale.

nWam

The skin changes color and

ad terribi1e contrahitur et infrigidatur,
et alteratur homo et pallesoit. H26 The etteot ot intense emotion

26

001'

Ibid., 10, n. 1$1.
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on the body is well known.

27

Th1s olose conneotion between the

passion and the bodily change led in modern tImes to the JamesLange theory whIch identlf1ed the emotIon wIth the peroept1on of
the bod1ly change.

28

SInce a bodily change Is essential to a pas.ion, the
change that takes place Is not motus In the wide use of the word
but In the strict use.

The gradual alteration consists precisely

in this bodIly change.

St. Thomas states this tact verr clearly

and oonoisely.

27 Bishop Fulton Sheen gives a striking example ot the
extent ot bodIly change during intenae emotion. "There 18 a oaa.
on record In England ot a nursing mother whose m1lk poisoned her
bab1 because ot the intense hatred whioh she bore her husband. tt
Fulton J. Sheen, Ph.D., D.D., Peace of Soul, New York, 1949, 110.

-----

~

28 No one could expound James' theorr in a more colorful way than he himself do.s.
"~theorl. on the oontr~.. 18 that the bodl11 ohanges
follow direct1z .lli!. ;eeFCeEUon of l i eiCitl"iif !!:l, and .!ili!! £B:!:
leelins of the same olianges as
occur Is he emotTOri. • • •
we reera"'Oriy beoause we ovy,
The morerai'IOniri'tatement I i
angry beoause we strike.
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
one of the bodllZ chanses, whatsoever it
Is
FELT. • ••
wi""7aneiTome strops emotIon, ana: then ~toi'bitract fromour consoi"miinese 0 it all theTeeITiii's 0 Its
Sodliy sziiPiOmi';-we fInd we bivenotli'1iif1el'r 6eblna ••--: Wlii't
kInd of 'an emotion or-riar-wOUIl be let rr-the feeling neither
or the quickened heartbe&ts nor of shallow breathing, ne1ther of
trembling lips nor or weakened limbs, neither ot goose-flesh nor
of visceral stirrings, Were present, it is quite tmpo8s1ble for
me to think. •• A purelf dieembodied human e.otion is a nonentity." W1l1iam Jame., PrlnclEles !! PSlchologz, Bew York,
19)1, II, 449-452.

itt

EVi?Z
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Ira, et simi11ter quae11bet pas.10 animae, dupliclter pot.st
cona1derar1: uno modo secundum propr1am ratione. lra•• et
slc per prius .at 1n anima quam in oorpore:et all0 modo
In quantum eat paaaio, .t s10 per pri~geat in corpore, Ibl
enim priao aoclplt ratione. passionia.
Na. secundum reoeptione. tantum, dioitur quod sentire et

intelllgere est quoddam pati. Passl0 aute. cum abJeotione
non est nisl seoundum transmutatione. corporalem: unde
pasal0 proprie dlcta non potest competere animae Bisl per
accldens, inquantum scillcet composltum patitur. 3
The

bodl1y change is an essent1al ingredient ot the def1nition.

In tact, it 18 because of the alteration ot the body that a passion is a passion and Is oalled a passion. 31
Arter at. Thomas has established tbat a bodl17 change
1s e.sential to a passion, he considers an Interesting objection.
Both .ensitlve appetite and sensitive cognition are aocompanied
b1 bodily changes.

It a passion ot the soul ocours because

or

bod111 changes, 8ense cognition should a180 be called a passion
1n tne proper sense ot the word and not only in a Wide aense.
Thomas anawer8 that the b04i11 change 1n cognitlon ia inten-

--

29 De Ver., 26, 2, ad 5.

-Cardinal CaJetan has the same interpretation of St.

30 S.T., I-II, 22, 1 c.

31

Thomas' notlon ot a passion:
"Omnis passio animae est cum allqua praeternaturall mutatione, quia cordia motus intenditur aut remittitur a suo naturali motu: et ex hoc il1a opera animae quae vocamus ejus passiones, habent ratione. et no.en passlonis." In S.T., I-II, 22,
Thomas de Vio Cajetanus, Oomaentar1a In Summa !heoleglae, Leonine ed., Bemae, 1891, VI, 16~.
--

19

tional.

An .i.n.t.e.n.t.i.o

!!!

i8 received in sen.e cognitlon.

The

act of cognition consiets in the receptlon of the torm of another
preoiselr as the torm of another.

The subjective change in the

organ is not Intrins1c to the act of cognltion itself whloh looks
to the object.

On the other hand, appetenoy 1s a subjectlve

strivlng toward the object.

The bodl1y change Is part of the

movement ot the soul toward or awar trom the object.

Therefore,

the bodily ohange 18 an essential constltuent ot the aot ot appetencr but not ot the act ot cognltlon. 32
Damascene'. full detinition ot a passlon ot the loul
includes the notlon ot appetlte.

"Passl0 est motus appetltlvae

vlrtutls senslbills In imaginatlone bon! vel mall."
appetltiva. need. further elucldation.

The word

St. Thomas analrzes the

Latln word aepetltus to give a clearer understanding of what appetite Is.

"Appetere aut .. nihil allud eat quam allquld petere,

quasi tendere In allquid ad Ipsum ordinatum."J3

The act of the

appetite, theretore, is a strlvlng or stretchIng ot the subject
toward Its proper object or end.

All appetIte arlses from a need

tor somethlng whlch Is not passessed as ,et. 34 The act ot appetencr in creatures 18 nothing but a movement of the subject

32

33

34

S.T., I-II, 22, 2 ad 3.
-De Ver.,
c (ad tlnem).
-!!!. !!!l.!.., 15, n. 8.

ct.

22, 1

I
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toward things whioh would actualize the subject and bring It
more pertection.

Prime matter has an appetlte tor form, plants

have an appetlte for molsture, anlmals have an appetlte tor .eat.
Every man experienoe. within him.elfth1. inner drive tor .ore
perfection.
It i8 important, though, not to confu.e this search
tor perteotion wlth &ft7 act of cognitlon.
nltion.

Appetite is not cog-

fhe appetlte a.ek8 the thlng as it i8 in It8elt: oog-

nit10n gra8p8 the th1ng IntentionallJ.
the appetite i. 1n the thing.

The 800d whioh perteot8

That which i8 true and pertect8

the intellect i8 in the intellect intentional17.35

Cognition

pos8es8e. on17 an intention of the goodl the appetlte want. the
rea11ty.36

St. Thaaaa gives a brier and luoid comparlaon ot the

two aotal
Siout bonum nominat 14 in quod tendit appetltua, ita verum
nom1nat Id in quod tendit Intellectu8 •. Hoc aute. d1stat
inter appetltus et intelleotua, 81ve quamcumque cognltlon. . ,
quia cognitio eat 8eoundum quod oognitum est in cognoscente:
appetltua aute. eat secundum quod appetena Inclinatur in
Ips. . rem appetltam. it slc terminus appetltua, quod est
bonua, est in re appetlbil1 •••d tJ~ua cognitloni., quod
eat v.rum, 8at in ipso Intelleotu.
There are two waya in which It can be clearly .een

--

35 ne Ver., 26, 3 c (prin.).
36

37

Ibld., 22, 3 ad 4.
-S.T.,
I, 16, 1 o.

--
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that appetency i8 not cognition.

AppetIte tollows cognition, and

that which tollows cognition cannot be cOgnition. 38

The distinotion between appetite and cognition 1s more clearly seen trom
the tact that the cognition ot an object and the inclination tor
it can be separated.
be aeparable.

Tho.e things which are d1stinct need not

Act and potency are distinct but inaeparable.

things whioh can be separated certainly are distinct.

But

And the

cognition ot an object and the de.ire tor it can be .eparated.
This ia clearly seen when an emotion telt toward an object
changes while the cognition ot it remains the same.

When a hun-

gry man sees toad, he teels a strong attraction tor it.

However,

as the man starts to eat what has been set betore him, his need
for tood becomes less.

It more tood i8 set betore a man atter

his appetite haa been satistied oompletely, the man no longer
wants it.

The m.an aeea the same thing which he saw sometime be-

tore, but he no longer teels the same attraction toward the tood.
What delighted him .everal minutea betore now haa no appeal tor
him.

The cognition ot the obJect 'remains the same; the appetite

tor it haa changed.

39

The act ot a tinite oreature always has a correspond-

-See- S.T., I-II, 3$, 5 c.

38 S.T., I-II, 35, 1 c.
39

--
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Damascene's full definition includes the word vir-

ins potency.
tuti8.

"Palsio est motus appetitivae virtutis sensibilia in

imaginatione boni vel mali."

Virtu8 indioates that the act at

appetenoy has a potency, a principle

or

operation.

In tact, ap-

petency is nothing more than tne movement ot the potency toward
its act.

There are two kinds of potencies; one is active, the

other paasive. 40

Aciive potency is a power ot giving perfection;
passive potenoy is the power of receiving pertection. 4l Since
a passion by its very name i. a reception, the potency ot the
sensitive appetite must be a passive potenoy.

42 This passive

potency, however, i8 not a purely passive and inert potency such
aa prime matter.

It i. still an operative potency.

The next word to be examined in Damascenets detinition
is aensibilia.

There are several kinda ot appetites.

The appe-

tency involved in a paSSion ot the soul must be distinguished
traa other appetitive tendencies.

Natural appet1te ia without

Natural appetite is the movement ot a being which

cognition.

do•• not enjoy cognition toward a good which is proper to it.
St. Thomas conceived the proper place tor heavy ,bing. such

a8

40 "Potentia. • • eat enim princ1p1um quoddam agend1
vel patlendl." !e II Q! .A.n_i.m&., 6, n. 304.
41 e.a., II, 25 (prin.), Summa Contra Gentiles,
Leonine manual-.a., Rama., 1934. 111.
'

42

Ver., 25, 1 e (prin.).
-De

2)

rock. to be down in the center ot the earth.

The natural appe-

tite ot a rock, theretore, was an inclination to be oarried
downward. 43

This downward inolination is without oognition ot

the end tor which the rock is striving.
min.d .nd.

Every being has a deter-

It evel'1 creature did not have a d.termined .nd,

there would be no reaaon wh7 the b.ing ahould aot one way rather
than another. 44 However, difterent creaturea tend toward their
r.spective ends in difter.nt way..
ple.

A

which

i~

The need. ot a rook are stm-

rook doe. not need cognition to discover ·the place toward
must tend.

An animal, how.v.r, has more pert.ction and

ne.d. more thinga to pert.ct it. natur..

The animal neede cog-

nition to di.cov.r the thing. which it needs.

Once the animal

•••• aomething which i. good tor it, the sensible app.tit. urg••
the animal toward it. 45
St. Thoma. give. another explanation tor tne exi.tence

ot differ.nt kind. ot appetite..
toward th.ir end ot th....lv...

Some creature. such a. man t.nd

Other creature. are dir.ct.d

toward their goal b.J another a. an arrow i. direot.d toward a
determined plac. b1 the archer.

Creature. that go toward the1r

end ot th....lv•• ne.d cognit1on to d.t.rmine what the1r prop.r

43
44
45

-e.G.,
--

25, 1 c.
III, 2 (ad t1n.. ).
V.r., 25, 1 c.

De Ver.,

-De

object is.

Those beings whioh have no knowledge ot th.ir goal

MUst be directed toward it by another.
toward their end by another. in two ways.

aeings can be directed
Someti.e. a being is

direoted toward sn end whioh does not belong to the being in any
sp.cial way.

When this ocCurl, the being does not aoquire a

torm which is proper to it.
tendency ot the being.
est violenta."46

Such a movement il contrary to the

In St. Thomal t words, "Talis inolinatio

It i8 in this tirat way that an arrow i8 di-

rected toward its target.

A being can be dir.cted toward its end

by another in a second war_

This inclination is natural and is

put into the being by the one who dir.cts the being toward itl
end.

'I'h1s happena when someone givel weight to a rock which

gi.e. the rock a natural inclination downward.

It i8 in this se-

cond way that all creature I which do not enjoy cogn1tion tend
toward their end.

They have been given an inner principl. by the
The cognition ot the end ot inlenlible

fir.t mov.r who is God.
creaturel 11 1n

God~o

made the nature.

Th. inner principle

give. the beingl a natural inclination toward an object which il
proper to the being and which will pertect it.
The len.e appetite exists 1n beings that tend toward
their end ot th.... l •• s.

This •• It-dir.cted appetency has two

46 De Ver., 22, 1 c (in medio). The body ot this ar-

ticle give. a

~tiITed

explanation ot natural appetite.
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subdivisions.

One is the senae appetite; the other is the ra-

tional appetite.

Another Latin word for the sensitive appetite

is sensualitas.

As st. Thomas tells us, the name tor the appe-

tite 1s derived

~om

the sense cognition which it follows.

"Sen-

sualitas nihil aliud esse videtur quam vis appetitiva senaitiv.e
partis: et dicitur sensualita8 quasi aliquid a sensu derivatum.
• ••

In que.ntum ergo ex appetibili apprehenso per sensua move-

tur vis appetitiva interior, ejus motus sensuali. dlcltur. n41
The sensitive appetite is the mid-point between the natural appetite and the rational appetite or the will.

The sensitive appe-

tite, therefore, must be distinguished tram the rational appetite.
It is already olear that a bodilY change is pssential to a passion.

The intellectual appetite is essentially Independent ot

any bodily organ.

immaterial.

The intellect and 1ts appetite is completely

No bodily change is involved when the will loves the

good. 48

Moreover, the appetites are distinguished by their ob-

jects.

Since the appetites are passive, theT are distinguished

by the difference in their agents or movers.

A sensible good

moves the sensitIve appetIte; an Intelleotual good moves the rational appetite.

49 The senaible good is particular; the intel-

---

41 De Ver., 2$, 1 c (prin.).

48 S.T., I-II, 22, 3 c.
49 Ibid., I, 80, 2 o.

-
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leotual good is un1versal. 50

As Xhomas says, senaation grasps a

colored thing; intellection grasps the nature of the oolor.
"Sensus est apprehendere hoo ooloratum, intel1ectus autem ipsam
nat~am ooloris."5l
St. Thomas emphasizes another major distinotion between
sensit1ve appetite and intellectual

appet~te.

The appetites are

distinguished by the more perfect ways in which they seek their
proper objects.

As a being beoomes more perfect and thus more

like to God, it becomes more act1ve and less pass1ve.

God,~

selt, although He is the tirst mover, cannot be moved in &n1
senae ot the word.

Beings without cognition are completely pas-

sive as they tend toward their proper object.

The more perfect

beings, Which enjoy sense oognition, are more act1ve.

Material

beings have nothins within them that act1vely moves them.

The

natural appetite is an inner principle whioh gives the being an
inclination to be moved by another.

A rock has weignt which

gives tne roo.k a natural inclination to be oarried downward by
the toroe ot gravity.

Animals with sense oognition move them-

selve. in the sense that the intention ot the thing within the
antmal move. the animal toward the desired object.

The sens.

good whioh has been apprehended and whlch is ln the anlmal lnten-

51
50

De Ver., 25, 1 c (ad finem).
-De Ver., 22, 4 ad 2.
--
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tionalll move. the sense appetite.

Thus there i • • omething with-

in the animal whioh is moving it and whioh make •• ense appetite
more active than natural appetite.

But the animal's inner urge

itself is not within the power of the animal.

Once the an1mal

sees a good which 1s pleasureable, it can do nothing but desire
the good.
power.

On

the other hand, man's inclinations are within his

A ratlonal being can be moved toward a good or not be

moved toward a good as he

80

wishes.

The movement of a rational

being is relatively rree and deter.mined by htmself, not by anoth
Even though a rationai being seos a particular good, he need not
be moved by 1t.

The will aeeks the good in general and is not

determined by &n7 particular good. 52
To SUB up, a passion belongs to sense appetency, not
natural or rational appetency.
fhi. chapter has almost completely explained Damaoene's derlnition, "Passio est motus appetltivae virtutis sensibilis in imagination. batt vel mali."

The words In imagination.

boni vel mall have not been treated explicltly. However, it is
-already clear that St. Thomas insists that sense appetite is had
only through sense cognitlon.

4 c.

"Appetlbile vero non movet appe-

--

52 This whole treatment is taken fram De Ver., 22,

28
titum nisi apprehenaua. n53
passion.

Good or evil i8 the objeot ot the

The good is that toward wnich the appetite tends.

tact, good is detined as "quod

In

omnia appetunt. n54

The concept ot a passion ot the 80ul is becoming clearer.

A passion is a move.ent caused by an extrinsic agent.

This

movement i8 a strict alteration because a passion is an act ot
the composite.

The bodily changes which accompany a passion mean

the acquisition ot new torma and the loss ot old ones.

The move-

ment itselt is a stretching out ot the appetite toward a good apprehended br senae cognition.
In a pas.ion the act ot the soul is an immanent act
which pertect.

~e

soul, not an extrinsic agent. 55

experienced amotions or passiona.

Everyone has

William Jaaes says that noth-

ing i. lett when we strip an emotion ot the perception ot the
accODlP&ny'ing bodily change..

Although that something may be dit..

ficult to descrlbe, we know that theN Is more to an emotion than
bodily change..

Thi. movement ot the soul 1s an inner liking or

repulsion tor an object.

This act is passiv., too, in the sen.e

that it 1a caused by an extrinsic agent.

----

Aa an immanent act,

53 De Ver., 25, 1 c (prin.).
54 ne Var., 22, 1 8.C. 2 & c.
55 ct. S.T., I-II, 31, 5 Cj Ibid., 74,

-

1 c.
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however, the ohange involved in & pasaion difters from a reception in an lnant.ate being.

!he intluence ot the agent i. re-

ceived into a vital aotivity ot the soul.

Thi. vital aotivity i.

not the perception ot the bodl11 ohange. but the verJ like or dis11ke itselt ot the object ot the pa•• ion.

Atter the explanatlon ot a passion whlch baa been siven
in this chapter, the defInition it.elt can be .tated brietly.

A

pasalon ot the aoul 1. at the .... time an immaterial and a bodily mov.ment ot the .enae appetite toward a good or away from an
evl1.

This detinition ot passlon will yield a clearer inaight

into the nature ot a particular pas.ion, .adn••••

CHAPTER II
WHAT IS SADNESS T

The hero strikes out with tne bases loaded: a business
tails, a mothep loaes her son in the war.
these 1a aadness.
sadnesa.

The ettect ot allot

Everyone has direct and immediate knowledge ot

There 1a no need to explain what sadness ia to a mother

who has lost her son.

She knows.

What th1s chapter intends to

yleld i. not an experimental knowledge ot sadness, but a philosophical knowledge, a knowledge ot the essence ot sadn.s. acqUiPed through reflection on our immediate experience.

Bowever,

ainee the a1m ot thi8 work Is alway. to give the essence at 8adnes. according to St. Thomas, the search for a definition ot
sadness w11l not be an independent one, but one based directly
on the text ot st. Thomas.
Thomas affirms that sadness is not only a paSSion, but
a prinCipal passion.

The principal passions are those which pre-

cede the others and are their source.

Good and evil are the ob-

jects ot the passiona, and joy or sorrow immediately follows contact with good or evil.
passions.

The other passions tollow thes. basio

For example, evil becomes samething to
)0

be

hated only

31
because it is recognized assomething which causes sadness.

1

Moreover, sadness is a passion in the strictest sense of the word
Sadness takes precedence even over joy.

As has been seen, a pas-

sion properly involve. the loss of a contrary form.

A

man who

casts ott his sickness and acqulne. health experiences a pa.slon
slnce sickness ls a torm which is contrary to health.

However,

in the strlctest use of the word a passion ooours only when a
form whiCh is proper to

th~

subject i. lost.

When a man rids

himselt ot sickness, he is not losing a torm whioh is proper to
him.

When a man lose. his health, which is proper to him, then

he suffers a passion In the strictest sense.

Thus a passion ia

had more properly when the change ia tor the worse.

In this way,
aadness is a passion in a more proper sense than joy is. 2
Potency as such is essentlally ordained to act.

Be-

cause of this essential ordinatlon, the potenoy can be known only from the aot to whlch it is ordained.

Thus the nature ot anr

particular potency is asoertained by learning the aot .. ~ whioh it
i8 ordained.

When there is questlon ot an operative potenoy, Its

act wl11 have an object, and the object wl1l determine and speclty the nature ot the act.

1

The sen.e appetite 1s a potency ot

--

De
Ver., 26, $; S.T., I-II, 2$,
_............

2 S.T., I-II, 2$,

---

4;

4.

De Var., 26, $.

-~
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the soul which 1s orda1ned to tbe act ot appetency. and this act
bas as its object tbe aenaible sood whicb is to be attained.
Since the attainment of tbe senaible good may preaent aome ditficulty, the aenaible 8004 to be attained mal be considered under two aapecta: the senaible good itselt, and tbe difficulty or
arduousness of ita attainment.
being

dete~ed

Consequentll, the aenae appetite,

by its object, the aenslble good, also has two

aspects or parts.

When the sense appetite has good or evil aa

such .s its object, the concupiacible appetite begins to operate.
The irascible appetite 1s called 1nto action when the tending ot
the appet1te 1s directed toward a good or an evl1 considered under the aspect of Its arduousness of attainment.

Thus the tunc-

tlon of the lrasoible appetite ls to overoome Anl dlfflculty
which mlght be necessU7 to acqulre a good or flee an evl1.

An-

ger, for example, ls an irasclble pas.lon because 1t helps the
subjeot to avold a dltfloult evil.

Since sadness s1mp17 looks

to evil as such, sadness does not have the aspect of arduousness
as Its Object.

Sadness, theretore, is a conoup1soible passion,

not an irascible one.)
Sadness must be distingulshed trom the other specle8 ot
passIon in order that a distinct and preCise ooncept ot sadness

3

S.T ••
.....

I-II, 23, 1; De Ver., 2$, 2 c.
-~
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may be obtalned.

Since an operatlve potency Is dlstinguished by

Its object, the passions d1fter as the agents which are thelr objects dlffer.

Agents can d1fter elther accordlng to thelr nature

or accordlng to the ditferent vay_ in which th., act on the patlent.

The tirst chapter has alreadJ d1soussed the war. 1n which

the agent can exert influence on the patient. 4 The agent can
glve the patient a certain inclination to tend toward the good.
Thus the agent makes the patient well-dispcs.d toward the good
and gives it a certain atfinity wlth the good.
the patlent toward the good i8 the passion love.

This leaning ot
It the agent is

an evil, It can cause a certain incompatibillty between
petlte and the ev11 object.
the ev11 is called hate.

;~e

ap-

Th1s repulsIon of the appetite tra.

It the good 1s not yet possessed, the

agent can cause a movement of the appetite toward the object.
This movement ot the appet1te toward the possession of the good
is called desire or concupiscence.

On the other hand, it the

agent is evil, 1t can cause aversion or dislike ot the appetite

tor the Object.

This turning away ot the appetite trom evil is

called averslon.

The agent can cause a certain restful rellsh-

Ing ot the appetite In the good once the good 18 possessed.
restful relishing ot the good 18 called delight or J01.
(

This

The

~ \STOW-;~',
<&
"- f;1 /' '

4 S.Chapter I, p. 8.
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agent oan oause a certain dis8atisfaotion or disoomfort ot the
appetite in the presence ot evil i t the object 1s evil and 1n
actual oontaot wlth the subjeot.

This dlssatlsfaotion or dis-

oomfort of the appetite when oontronted with a present ev11 la
oalled sorrow or sadness.
The irasoible passions presuppose the inclinatlon to
obtain the good or the urge to tle. ev11 produoed by the
plaolble passlons.
plscenoe.

;.~ncu

Hope, tor example, supposes desire or oonou-

Bowever, although d.slre looks to a tuWr'e good abso-

lutely, hope deals with tbe arduousneS8 ot obtaining a tuture
Thu8 hope i8 a movement ot the appetlte toward a

good.

tuture good which is
quire.

80U~lt

diftloul~

as something not impossible to ac-

Despair is the opposite of hope.

Despair i. the repul-

sion of the appetite trom a diffloult, tuture good oonsidered 1mP088ible to aoquire.
it.

Courage attack8 diff10ult evil to overoome

Pear is the fle.ing of the appet1te trom a d1tfioult, tuture

ev11 which cannot be overcome.

If the d1tf1cult evil object 1.

aotually present, anger moves to punish tbe evil which has attacked the subject.

-

Exceptlng anger (ira), the passions always oome In
palrs.

For the oonoupisclble passlona, this palring ott 18 due

to the objects ot the pa8s10n8, good and evl1.

-

Love (amor) 1.

an attraotion ot the appetite toward the good; the repulsion ot

the appetite from evil is called hate (odium).

The movement of

the appetite toward the acqui&ltion ot the good not pos.es.ed i.
called de.ire or oonoupiscence (deaiderium), averaion or dislike
(tuga) is the turning of the appetite from evil.

Joy (saudiua)

i. the resting ot the appetite in the good, sorrow or sadness
(trlatitla) i& the dis.atistaction ot tne appetite in the presence ot evil.

Hope (spes) considers a diffioult tuture good as

attainable, despair (desperatio) considers the difficult tuture
good as unattainable.

Oourage (audacia) attacks a difficult fu-

ture evil, fear (timor) tlees a dittioult future eVil. 5
Knowing the general diviaions and subdivisions of the
passions, we can distinguiah aadneas more ea8ily now from the
other apecies ot the pasaions.

-

Sadnes& haa evil tor its object.

It can be ea&ily distinguished, therefore, from all species of
the passions whioh have good as their object such as love, deSire, jOl, hope, and despair.
obJeot.

Sadness haa a ereaent

!!!! as its

It can be e.sily distinguished, theretore, trom all

species ot the passions which look to the future such aa hope,
despair, courage, and tear.
ouaness ot avoiding the eVil.
from tear and anger.

Sadness doe. not consider the arduThus it i. easi11 distinguished

Like sadne.a, anger has a pre.ent evll aa

S Th. treat.ent ot the specie. ot the passlons waa
ba•• d prtmarily on S.T., I-II, 23. 4 c.
.

--
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Its object.

Unlike sadness, anger attaoks the difficulty of the
present evil as able to be overcome. 6 Sadness succumbs to the
present evl1. 7 In brier, sadnes. has evil tor It. object, not
good; a pre.ent evil, not a

tut~e

evl1; and evil considered ab-

solutely, not the arduousness at overoomlng the eVl1.
St. Thomas oompares delight and sadness to the atflrmation and denial ot the Intellect.

As an affirmation assents to

that whioh Is true, so dellght clings to that which 18 good.

Aa

.0

a denial does not agree to tal.ehood,
sadness retreat. from
evl1. S Sadness 18 the opposite of delight. Delight accepts that
whioh the appetite possesse..

Sadnes8 Is tleelng, as It were,
the evil with whioh the appetite Is In contact. 9 The appetite

ba. not yet started to tlee tro.. the evil.

enoe the appetite

starts the motion away trom the eVil, the subjeot experlenoes
the passion averllon whloh Thomas calls tusa In Latin.

Sadness

1. In aotual contact with eVil, but It looks on evil as a term!-

6

1

Ver.,
-l-!.,
De

26,

40

(In media).

I-II, 23, 3 c.

8 ftlntelleotus enl. In Judlcando habet duos actus sol11cet atflrmatlone., qua aSlentlt vero, et negatlone. qua dlssentit a talso. Qulbua duobus respondent duo proportlonabl11ter In
vi appetltlva, scl110et prosecutl0 qua appetltus tendlt In bonum
et Inhaeret el et tusa qua recedl t a Mlo .t dlssentl tel. " In
VI Ethlcorum, 2, n. 1128, ed. Plrotta,:R.M. Splaszl, T~ln, 1~9,
310. EIsewliere St. Thomas tells us that sadness pertains to
flight.
9 S.T., I-II, 35, 4 ad 2.

--
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10

guo.

Lik. hate, sadne •• mak•• the aubject ill-disposed

toward the evLl.
With th••e prel1alnarr notione or ••dne.s, we can now
examine trt,'ltla to ,.e whether or not 1t tultl1s the not10n ot
pa.slon.

A

pa.a1on ot the aoul w•• det1ned

a move••nt, at

&8

ODoe bod117 and tmaaterial, ot the ,en.e appetite toward a good
or awq

Sadne •• has evil tor ita object, and the
ev11 1. mow through .enae copltion. ll OertainlJ there la an
!POll

~terial

Thi.

an ev11.

move.ent ot the a.n.e appetite awa7 trom

~aterial

graph.

move••n' vaa 4e.cr1bed in the preceding para-

When eaaeon. 1e lad, he i. in actual cont.ct wlth evl1;

but h. wlabe. that he vere not In luoh a plight.

When the hero

.trlke. out with the baa.. loaded, the tana are aad.
whloh

~•• vil.

tn.., hated and trl,d to avoid 1. nova reall'7.

The evil
The Im-

material pot.n07 ot the senae appetlte tlnda itaelt agltated and
in a atat. ot dl •• atl.taotion.
Ia .adnea. alao a 004117 aovement ava7 Ira th. evil?
Doe. the bod1 prote,t againat

~.

ev11, too?

Bot on11 doe. St.

!haa.a atflrm tbat an adver.e bodil1 change ocour. in sadne •• ,
but he even luist. that aadne.a haraa the b041

othar pas.lon.

-Ibld., 3S, 1 o.

-

than &n7

Thomas oonsldered huaan l1te to conslst in • oer-

10 S.T., I-II, 2), 2 o.
11

lu~r.

)8

taln motlon hom the heart to the

othe~ JIl8Jaba~s

ot the Cody.

"Conslatlt en!m humana vita In quadaa motiona, quae a corde In
cetera .mbra dlttu.nelltur: quaa qulde. motl0 oOllvenlt naturae hu,
12
manae .ecunc!um allquam dataaiDat....ansur... tt
All the pa.siona whioh conalat In a move..nt toward a good do not stop tbi.
vltal tlow or motion but

~atha~

the passlon Is aoelente.

sti.ulate tha moveaant .a long a.

It the passion beco.e. 1Irm.oderate, the

boely can be harmed b7 the.e passiona , too.
.low down or
Fear

and

.OM

to~

example, stop thls vital motion because

the, conal.' In a tlight or WithdPawal rz.oa e.,11.
ne •• weighs down the aoul mope than tear
ev11 Is actuallJ pp•••nt and'make. a
evil whioh is ,et to

paaalou

this vital motion ot thelr verr nature.

~estrlet

d.spair,

But

0088.

o~

Bovever, aad-

de.pair because the

.t~on&e~

impression than an

Sadnes. alow. down bodil, aove_nt In

seneral by constricting the heart whloh i. the ,principle ot motion in the bodl. 13

Jast aa the aen.ltlve appetite ahrlnk. vben

contronted with evil, so the heart contracta and alowa down when

12 a.T., I-II. 31, 4 c. Thomaa vas not tamillar with
all the t1n41qs-ot sodeR aclence, but thia vltal aotlon from
the beart would .e. to be aiDd.lar to the olpoulatlon ot the
blood whicb auppliea the organa ot the bodr with the tood that
they n •• d.

--

13 S.T., III, 84, 9 a4 2.
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the subject encountera eVl1. 14
Thaaas haa otten been cr1t1c1s.4 tor b.lng woeful17
backward and nalve 1n mattera o£ natural acience.

But it would

bard11 be tail'" to expect St. Thomas to have as vast a knowledge

ot natUl'al acience aa an age .1x centurle. later Vh1ch haa
stre •• ed the material to the neglect ot the immaterlal.

A. it

i~

Thomaa' description ot the 004111 change 1n aadne.s does not dit-

tel'" essentiall7 trom toe descr1ption ot a more modern expept,
W1lli.. 1..... 1S The bo4111 ohaD,e. in lamea. desorlptlon are

14 JOhn ot st. ~oma. also conslder. the bodl1, ohange
1n aadne.a to be a constr1ctlon ot the heart. See Joanni. A
Saneto Thoma, O.F., Ouraus Pbiloaoph1oua Thomlaticua, 04. nel.er,
Taurln1, 1930, I, oIS, 34 b.

J....

1$ Wll1iam
at v.. a ....1!7 int.re.ting an4 complete
ot the b041ly change. which OOCUl' dur1ng aadnes ••
Hl. d.e.cription i. taken .from the Danlah ptqalo1og1d.; C. Lana••
"The ealer teature 1n the pbJ8losnamr or arlat 1. perhap. ltapara17alng ettect on the volunt&PJ mov...nt • • • • • Hl.
volce Is weak and wlthout r •• onaaoo, 1n oon.equeace ot the teeble
actlvlt70t the mu.aoles of expiration aa4 ot the l.arJnx. • • •
The tontoit,- 01' 'latent innervation' or the mU8cl•• i. 8trikinglyd1a1ni.Ud. The neok is oeDt, the head. haag- 'bowed. down' with
griet. the . .laxation ot the cheek and jaw au.ole.
the
taoe loOk long and narrow, tbe jaw ma7 even bang open. The e70.
appear 1.... .a i8 alv.,. the oa.. where the orbioulari. muacl.
1. para~zed., but theT mal otten be partlJ oover.a: 6T tHe upper
11d whlchdroop. in conaequence ot the lam1ft& ot 1ta own levator.
• • • Another 81de • • • belong. • • • to the lnvolunt&r7 or
'orsanlo' muacl•• , e.peoiall7 tho.e which are tound. in the wall.
ot the blood........ l., and tho UStt ot whlch 1., b7 oontracting, to
d~1nl.h the latter'. calibre • • • • Instead ot belng paralTsed,
• • • the vasoular mUlcl.. are more strongl,. contracted. than usual, 80 that the tlaaue. and organ. ot the bod,. beoome anaemic.
• ••• The mouth gPo"a drJ', the tongue .tIckJ'. and a bItter
taste enau•• whloh, 1t would appear 1s only a con••quence ot the
deacrlptio~

aak..
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ce.tainly a4ve.se.

The.e 1. a generalconatriction and ce.aation

Slnce Thoma. considered the heart as the .ource ot
16
all move.ent in an animal,
st. Thomas and Dr. Lange agree
of movement.

that sadne •• Involve. a general re.triction ot bodily activlt1e.
A defln1tion

ot .adness can now be tormulated.

Sadne ••

1. a pas. ion of the soul conaisting in a shrinklng ot the .en••
appetlte in the pre ••noe ot evil and entailing a constriotion of
the heart.

In .adness, the appetitive potenoy is in actual oon-

taot with a privation at the good which i. its end or proper objeo~Thi.

appetite.

is bound to bring di.satiafaction and emptiness to the
Sadness is a movement (motus) in the atrict sense,

for thepe i. a p-adual alteration in the body, and for the wora ..
There ls also an Immaterial movement of the aenae appetite away
tongue •• 4rJnea.. ~he expre •• lon tbitter .orrow' ma7 po.sibly
ariae tram thiaJ In nur.ing wamen the milk diminishes or altogether drie. up. one of the most regular manite.tation. ot
gr1et
weep1ng, w1th 1ts protu.e .eoretion ot tear.,
its .wollen .eddened face, red e7e., and augmented a.cret1on
trom the naaal aucoua . . .brane. • • • It the amaller ves8ela of
the lungs contract .0 that th•• e organa become anaemio, we have
(as i. lUIul UDder .uch GonU tiona) the fee11ng of insutficient
breath, aDd of oppres810n of the cheat, and the.e to~.nting
.en.aticaa increase the suttering. of the grie..,er, who seek. relief by lona-drawn 8igha, instinotively, 11ke e..,e'l!'1 one who
laok. breath t.om whatever cause." Dr. O. Lange, Ueber ae-uthsbewefiifen, ueber•• tst von H. Kurella, Lelpalg, 1887. Quot.d
Ii W
am I .... , Principle. !! PSlohololl', II, 443-44.$.

aaa . • •

--

16 S.T., I, 20, 1, ad 1.
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tram the evil. 11 Thus ladnes. 11 a paslion in two ways.

In the

tlr.t place, the object causes a gradual, bodily alteration in
the patlent.

Secondly, the .entlent being is attected adversely

by the agent and tbe appetlte reacts against

thi..

Aa is the

case In all passlona, the.e changes are due to the 1nfluence at
the agent or object.
There are two Latin word. whlch Thomas uses to denote
what thi. the.is has called the paas,ion sadness.
words 1. trl.tltia, the other dolor.

One

ot these

There a ••ma to be a pro-

greaslon 1n St. Thomas' doctrlne on the u.e ot these words.

-

In

the De Ver1tate, an earlier work, St. Thomas atatea that dolor
1s not a passlon, but belongs to the aenae ot touch.

"Dolor, ae

cundum quod proprie accipitur, non debet coaputari Inter

an~ae

passlonea, qula nthll habet ex parte anlmae niai apprehenslon..
tantum, eat enlm dolor aensus laeaionia: quae quide. lae.l0 eat
ex. parte corporlsa ula
11 Cardinal Cajetan also separates the tmmaterial
.ovement ot the appetite trom the material change:
"Cua enim, aecluao o0rP0re, patl conalatat in recipere
ab agente et trah1 In 111ud, (omne enim agens, aS8imilando slb!
patlena, trah1t 11lud ad se) et para apprebenalva minus trahatur
ad agens quam para appetltlva: consequens eat quod pas810n1a
communiter dicta. maa1a habeat ratione. para appetltlva quam
apprehenalva." In S.T., I-II, 22, 2 c, ~era Omnia S. Thoma. de
Agu1no, Leon1ne
VI, 110 a. The ita cs are not-ln the -orIgInal.

ea.;

18

-De

Ver., 26,

4 ad 4.

St. Thomas also describes triatlti. as a pasaio

!e!-

malis and dolor aa a passio cot=poralls.· Pa8sio .an1malll OJ' "ps,..
chical pas.ion," begins in the knovledge ot samething harmful and
ends in an operatlon ot the appetite and further in
change.
gredient.

~e

bodil,.

Psychlcal passion haa sens. appatency as an intrinsic in
From thil same act ot appetency a bodily change i.sues

A psychical passion directly changes the body and il the aot ot
the bodily organ.

For it is through the operatlon ot th. appe-

titiYe potenoy that the heart, the organ ot the appetite, Is properly dispoaed.

The heart is the princlple ot motion in the bod

and once the heart haa been intluenoed by the paychlcal pas8ion,
it mOYes the boa, to possess the object toward whioh the .ensl19
tiye appetite i. inclined.
On the other band, a bodilr passion
i8 pJ'imarily in the body and attect. the soul only indirectlJ and
.econdarily.

Pasaio c0!E0ralla can be connected with the poten-

cie. ot the 10ul in three waY8.

All potencies ot the soul have

their roots in the essence ot the soul.

In this way, a bodilJ

passion can be attJ'ibuted to all potencies ot the soul because ot
their intimate interconnection.

Body and soul torm. an .2!!! per

and the soul is the torm of all the bodily povers
vell ••
-se,
of the spiritual powers. A bodily passion ls also connected with
a8

any potencr uslng a bodily organ becau..

--

19 De

Ve~.,

26, ) c.

&Dr

injury to the bodJ

taped.s the operation ot the faculty.
ily passlon is

co~ected

In this aaae way, a bod-

with intellectual potencies because the

intellect needs the phanta•• in order to operate.

Thirdly, eas-

!!2 coreorali. pertaina to the potency which cognize. the bodily
injur;y, the power which is called the senae ot touch.

Because ot

these interoonnectiona the soul can experience bodily ,assion,
but only because it sutters with the body, whIch 1s the real subject ot the passlon.

Thus the body undergoes the bodily passlon,

the .ense ot touch cognlze. the injury, but the soul is attected
only indirectly_

Dolor (which here would mean pain) 1s a bod1ly

pass10n tor dolor "incipit a laesione corporis, at

te~inatur

1n

apprehenalone sensus tactus, propter quod dolor est in sensu tac20

Verltate, therefore, St.
Thomas sa18 that dolor i8 a passio corRera11s and belongs to a
tus, ut ln appreheDdente."

In the

De

power ot cognition, the senae ot touch.
would not

b~

This means that dolor

a pas.lon in the strict lense aince cognition is not

strictly a passion.
In h1s more mature work st. Thomas atfirms that dolor
,
detinlte17 belongs to tn. appetite and not only to the power ot
oognit1on.

"Dolor, secundum quod est ln appetitu sensitivo, pro-

priaa1me d1c1tur pas8io anImae.,,2l

20
21

--

De Ver., 26, 3 ad 9.

--

S.T., I-II,

35, 1 c.

In the same article St. Tho-

mas eay. that dolor 18 always in the soul.

Dolor 1s said to be-

long to the b04y only beeause the bodl1y Injury 1s the cause ot
griet.

In the

E! Veritate Thomas connected a passl0 corporalis

w1th the soul only indirectly or else a. belonging to tbe sense

ot touoh. That there has been a change in doctrine i. indlcated
by the dltterent

w.,.

in which St. Thomas handles precisely the

same quotatlon trom St. Augustlne.

In dl.cusslng the re.pona1-

bll1ty ot the body and the soul respectively tor vice, St.

Ausus~

tine makes hls own distinction between dolor and trlstltla.

dDe

tristltia vero, quam Oicero magis aegritudtne. appelat, dolores
aute. Virgiliua, ub1 alt, 'Dolent8iudentque,' (eed 1deo malul

_

trlst1tiam dicere, quia aegrltudo vel dolor usltatlus 1n corporIbus dlel tUl'. ) If 22

In the De .............................
Veritate st. Thomas uses this quota-

tion to support his teaching that dolor 1s a bodily paSSion which
2.3
belongs to the sen.. ot touch.
In the Summa one artlcle Is devoted to showing that triat1t!a 1s simply a specles ot dolor.
When the very same quotation from st. Augustlne is given as an
objection, Thomas gives a ditferent answer.

Here St.

~homa.s

8a7s

that st. Augustine is only talking about the way in which the
word is used.

Since bodily affllctions are better known than
Pill

22 st. AUl'eliu8 Augustlne, De Clv1tate Del, 14, 6,
(In tlne). Oonta1ned 1n Patrologl.e L&tlnae cur;~omeletus,
Vol. 41, ad. Mlgne, Pari., 1960, 411a.

23

Ver., 26, 3 ad 9.
-De

45
splritual sorrows, dolor is used more otten tor bod1lr griet. 24
Thus in the Summa the bod1ly 1njury perce1ved br the sense ot
touoh 1. not dolor but the object and motive tor dolor.
trlstlt!a
, and dolor are in the sensitive appetite.

Both

The d1fter-

enoe between tne two lies 1n tneir object.
Siout aute.dolor senaibili. est in appet1tu .ensitivo, ita
et tri.t1t1a, sed est ditterentia secundum motivum, aive objectum. • .. objectum et motivum dolor!. e.t lae.l0 sensu
tactua percepta: .icut cua aliqui. vulneratur. Objectum aute. et motivum tristitlae eat nooivu. aeu malum Interiua
apprehensum, alve per rationem sive per imagination. ., aicut in Secunda Parte habltua est, aicu~ccum aliqu18 tristatur de &missione gratiae vel pecuniae. ~
st. Thomas make. the aame distinction in the Prima Secundae.

-

Dolor tollows the oognition ot the exterior sen.e, tria.

titia tollow. the cognition ot the interior aen.e.
ever, 1s the genus, triatitia i. the specie..

Dolor, how-

Dolor could be ap-

plied to the reaction ot tne appetite atter cognition either b7
the exterior .en.e or 01 the interior .ense.

Tristit1a is never

applied to tne appetite whlch tollows the exterior senae.

The

latter i. uaed onll atter cognit1on br the interior sense, or br
the intellect. 26 For the most part, this whole discusslon Is
.imp17 a matter ot a wide and a atrict use of words.

-Ibld., III, 15, 6
-Ib14.,
- I-II, 15, 2.

24 S.T., I-II, 15, 2 ad 1.

25
26

c.

Perhaps st.

46

Thomas inslsts in the Summa that dolor belongs

.0 the appetite

as well a. to cognition because cognition Is objective and t.ll.
us about the objeot.

Dolor, on the other hand, seems to be sub-

1".-

j.ctive, tor it tells the sUbJ.ct that the obJ.ct i. evil in
27
lation to it.

Following at. John Damuo.n., at. Thomas distinguish.s
tour sp.ci.s ot sadness.

Thes. tour are not sp.ci.s in the

str~

s.nse.

Strictly a species is constituted b7 an addition to the

genus.

This addition can take plac. in two ways.

When that

which is added is contained potentially in the genus, .s rational
is contained in antmal, the addition ls a true speci.s ot the ge.
nus.

Sometim•• , howev.r, som.thing is add.d to the genua which

do.s not belong to the notion ot g.nus even

potential~.

It is

in this second wa7 that the species ot sadness are derlv.d.
Ther. are specle. of .adnes. on17 because the notion of sadn•• s
is applied to something which is extrinsic to it.

This applica-

tion is mad. b.cause there is soma relation between sadness and
that to which it i. applied.
cause and ettect.

Thl. relation would be that of

The proper object ot sadne •• is an evil to

27 Mr. Richard R. Baker treats this matter trom the
opposIte direotion. Mr. Baker starts with the Summa and goes
baok to the De Veritat.. Although h. com.s to no definite conclusion, Mr.-Saier ••••• to think dolor does belong to the s.ns.
ot touch. "Thi. interpretation is more in accord with the judgment ot mo.t modern PS7cholo~~;:-st •• " See Thomistic Theory ot
the ....................
Pa•• iona, Notre nam., 1941; 68-7).
--

-

-
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one.elt.

An evil that happena to another Is not the proper ob-

jeot ot trlstltia.

However, another's evl1 oan be considered aa

an evl1 to oneselt, and the specles miserloordia ls tormed.
Plty or oompassion ls sadne •• over another's 8vil.

Sometlmes the

objeot la neither an evll to another nor onefs own evll, but
80meone e18.'s good.
evil, however.

Another's good ls considered as one's own

Thus the apecle. Invidla i. tormed.

• adne •• over the good ot another.

Envy

1•

It the sadneas arlaes because

ot the prosperity ot evl1 men, the specle. Is called Indignation
(nemesls); but the object 1. the same, the good ot another.

28

The proper ettect ot sadne.s Is a certain tleeing ot the appetlte away trom the evll.

It the posslbillty ot th1s ettect ot

aadnesa i. removed, a .pecle. ot .adne.s ls tormed which 18
called anxieta8 or AnSU!tla.

Anxiety or distress is 8adness be-

cause there seems to be no esoape tram the evil.

Another ettect

ot aadnes. is the slowing down ot the voluntal"J and involunta1'7
movements

ot

tne body.

It thls Immobl1lzation i8 complete, the

species acedia 1s tor.aed.

Boredom or 810th 1. such an t.mobll\

laation ot the exterlor membera ot the b0d7 that work becomes impos.ible.

In speclal ca.8. ot aoed1a even 'ithe power to speak i.

28

-In III -Sent.,

15, 1, 3.
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lost.

29

Sadness bas been detined as a passion ot the soul consIsting In a shrinkIng ot the sense appetIte In the presence ot
evIl and entailing a constrIction ot the heart.
tell.

U8

that dolor and tristitia reter prtaarlly to acts Dt the

s.ns. appetIte.
it.elt.

This detinition

At thla poInt, an

In~eresting

question presents

II trlstitla
,
. used onl1 tor sadness In the .en.e appetite

or a180 for a aiml1ar ...otlon In the will'

More than once St.

Thomas tells us that trlltltla and dolor tollow not only lena.
cognItion but alao rational oognitlon.

)0

St. Thomas has alrea«J

e.tabllshed that sadness Is properly In the sensltlve appetIte.
Passl0 vero an1aalls, cum per',.1lI. ex operatione anlmae
tranamutetur corpus, In 111a potentla esse debet quae organo corporall adjungltur, et cujul .at corpus trans.utare;
at Ideo hujusmodl passl0 non elt 1n parte Intellectlva,
quae non eat alicujua organ! corporalls actus • • • Et slc
In appetijiva .enaltiva lola, animalll passl0 proprle Inventtur."
It sadnesa belongs to the sense appetite, In what way can triatito a higher emotion in the vill'
-tia be applled
Catholics are quite tamiliar with the notion of repentance or sorx-ov tor slns.

But a man can grieve over an7 act he

29 For the whole treatment of tne specles of the passlons see S.T., I-II, 35, 8) also .........
De --.-.
Ver., 26, 4 ad 6.

--

~

)0

S.T.,
--

I-II,

--

3S, 2 c

and 7 OJ ......
S.T., III, 15, 6 c.

31 De Ver., 26, 3 c ( ad tine.).
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did in the past, whether the act be sintul or simply some fault
or mistake..
sadn....

On.

a .ense level, repentanoe is simply a

tOl"m

ot

Poen1tontl& i. not even a separate specie8 of sadn••••

tor the objeot ot repentance 18 an evil to on••• lt.

32 st. Thomas

explIcitly states that Eoenltentla i. a passion ot the soul.
"Poenitere e.t de allquo a 8e prius facto dolere • • • • Dolor vel
tr1.t1t1a duplclter dloitur.

Uno modo, .ecundum quod 8St pa88io

quaedam appetitus sens1tlvl.

Et quantum ad hoc, poen1tentia non

e.t virtua, sed passio.,,33

On the other hand, inJDloral aots are

onlJ apparent goods wbich are Improper

m.~s

evIl can be known onlyb,. the Intellect.
cannot tollow .en.e oognition.

to man t send.

Moral

Sorrow tor Immoral aeta

Thus there must be another type

ot repentance which 18 In the will, and

St~

Thomas 800n affiras

thls,14 Moreover, St. Thomas states that dolor InterIor Is
greater than dolor exterIor because tbe evIl is known more pertectly when tbe likeness In the Intellect i8 more immaterial and
abstract.

/

Since appetency in anImals depends upon cognition,

more perteot knowledge wIll mean a hIgher emotlon.

35

Since aadness Is a passion when it Is considered prop-

--

32 5.'1' •• I-II, 35, 8,

--

ad 2.

85, 1 c.
III, 85, 1 o.

33 8 .• '1'. , III,

34 Ibld.,

-

-

35 Ib1d •• I-II. 7 ad 2.
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erly, St. Thoma. 1. reluctant to call an act
appetlte .adn....

or

the lntellectual

He doe. admit, howev.r, that 80meti... aadnesa

is sald to be in the intelleotual appetite.

Thi. manner ot sp.ak

ing do.s not conslder the act ot the intellect ln reoognlzing
evll tor t he knowing ot evl1 is a good to the intelleot.

When

aadness 1. sa14 to be In the lntelleotual part ot the 'soul, 1t ls
beoau.e the Intellect hal dlscovered an evil which ls har.atul to
man

.

and whioh i. repugnant to hi. will.

36

Eight centU1"le. betore St. Thomas, st. Augustine had
said that tristltla va. an act

ot~e

Will.

Since St. Thoma.

quote. part ot this passage rather frequently, a flrat-hand inspeotion ot lt mlght be valuable.
,

Intere.t aut •• qualls 81t voluntas hominl.: q~la 81 perveraa
e.t, perversos babebit hos motus • • • • Voluntas eat quippe
ln omnibus: !mo omne. nlhil allud qu.. voluntatea aunt. • . .
quid e.t oupldita•• t laetltla, nial volunta. ln eorum conaenslone. quae voluaus? Et quid est •• tus atque trlstltla,
n181 volunta. ln dlssenslone. ab hl. quae nolumua' • • •
Cua aute. dla.enttmus a0 eo quod nolentlbus aooldit, tall.
voluntas trl.tltia 8.t.) 7
Thus st. Augustlne equates joy and sadnesa .wlth wllling and not
wll1lng.

When the wl1l doe. not vant an evil which is repugnant

to it, the will' aot i8 oalled sadne.s.

St. Thoma. recognizes

--

36 De Ver., 26, .3 ad 6.
37 St. Aurelius Augustin., De Civltat. Del, XIV, 6,

contained in Patrologiae

410 a.

La~inae

qurau'-ComEletus,-VOl. 41,
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the existence ot this tJPe ot act but doe. not call it a passion
or sadness In the strlct senae.

Tristltla is applied to this act

ot the will only because this act ls slmilar to the passlon or
emotion or sadness.

The act ot the will bas no direct connection

with anr bodily DlOvement.

The act ot the will i8 no emotion

since there 18 no motus 1n the strict sense. The will 1s free
38
and more active than a passion i8.
Objects do pleaae or displease the will. though, and these acts ot pleasure or diapleaa
can be called sadness.

"Alio modo loqui p08Sumu8 de gaudio et

tristltla secundum quod conaistunt In simplici actu voluntatis,
cui aliquid placet vel dlsplicet."39
In treating ot the,tallen angela--whos. existence Thomas knows through scrlpture--Thomas makes a tew statementa which
throw more light on the type ot sadness which resides in the wil
In Tiew of the tact that angels are immaterial beings, st. Thomas
10glcally concludes that angels cannot get angry or have any passions wnatsoever in the strict sen.e.

However, angels can be en-

Tious; and, as has been seen, envr is a species ot sadness.

Tho-

mas explains the origin ot the angels' envy in this manner.

The

artections try to aToid a certain type ot object tor the same

38 De Ver., 22, 4 c. "Et sic recedena (yolunta8] a
natura mobilis;-accedit ad naturam moventi. et agentis."
39

S.T., III, 84. 9 ad 2.
--
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reason that they tend toward Its opposIte.

Slnce the tallen an-

gela are proud, they conalder the good ot another as working agalnst theIr own good.

The angela want to be the most excellent

belngs; they grle.e oyer any good tortune ot man.

The good ot

another i8 oonsidered .a contrapy to their own wl11, and tnus the
tallen angela are "aad" and "Htnvloua."

The will at the tallen

angel la tPflng to work agalnst the good ot man. 40
It angela cannot have pasaiona In the atrlct .enae,
much le.. can God experlence a pas.lon.

Pa.slona ot the aenal-

tlve appetlte have two ele.enta, one .aterlal, the other

to~al.

The materIal el..ent In anger Is the heating ot the blood around
Tne tormalelement in anger 1s the punishIng ot the

the heart.

dIfficult evil which baa attacked the subject.
God haa no body.

Like the angela,

The mater1al element in a passlon la oontrary

to Bls immaterlal nature.

Unllke the angela, God is pure aot and

haa no imperteotion ot &nJ kind.

As has been

s~en,

the angela

can experience in a wide lense the tormal element ot enYJ.

In

God, however, not even the tOPaal element ot a paSSion can be
pre.ent it that tOl'm.al element implles an apartection.

The ma-

terial element ot sadness Is the constriction ot the heart.
does not have a bodil,. organ.

The formal ele..nt ot sadness is

the shrinking ot the appetite rrom an evil 1t possesses.

40

--

s.~.,

I, 6), 2 o.

God

No ev11
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can attect God tor this would be an impertection.
no ~pertectlon In God. 4l

There can be

Although the materlal ele.ent of a passlon can never be
applied to God and the tor.mal element can be applied only it it
contalns
God.

DO

Impertectlon, passlons are 80m.tlme. attributed to

The tormal ele.ent ot love is applied to God slnce God has

a will which by detinition tends toward the 800d.42 The tormal
element ot love (amor) containa no impertection.

Passions that
contain the notion ot Impertection oan be attributed to God only
metaphorically.
eelved.

Anger pre.uppoae. sadness over an injury re-

Anger seeks to punish the attacking, ditfioult evil.

God i. pure act.

tor Him.

No evil can touch God, and nothing i8 ditfioult

But God i. aaid

~o

be angrr metaphorically because

there is a likene.a in the ettecta ot anger and in the ettect. ot
God t • juatice.

Just a8 a man can punish evil action In anger,

God can puniah ev11 actlon In Hia justice.

The metaphor 1a me-

tODlRJ "in which a word ia uaed tor another which it suggesta or
whioh is elo.elf associated with it. ft43 . Here !Di£l i8 uaed tor
juat beca.. e both are clo•• 17 associated with puniaament.

41

Thia paragraph ia based on

--

~.I.,

42 S.T., I, 20, 1.
43 Michael P. X__er and Oharle.
Handbook,
, Chioago, 1953, 446.

It 1.

I, 20, 1 ad 2.

W. Mul.ligan, Writing
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In this metaphorical tashion that God 1s said to be sad.

God is

sad because same things happen which are contrary to that which
ae loves and approves.

It is 1n this same senae that August1ne

In a striot

and Thomas atfirm that sadness 1s 1n the human will.

senae, ne1ther t.he act ot God's will nor the act ot man's wIll 1s
a passion.
Repentance 1s nothing but a torm ot sadness.
said to be repentant, too, but only metaphorically.

God is

According

to the unchangeable order of divine providence, God sometime.
makes what He has previously destroyed or destroys what He had
previously made.
part of creatures.

However, these changes are 1n t1me and on the
God causes these etfects

mutable act ot His own.

by one eternal, im-

God 1s said to be repentant because the

ettect of His act of creation is similar to the ettect ot the act

ot a repentant man. 44
Misericordia is a specie. of sadness.
us that a compassionate man has a

~lserum~.

St. Thomas tells
When the compas-

sionate man .ees another in misery, he is sad because the merciful man considers another's evil as his own.

God cannot be mer-

citul in the strict sense because no evil can aftect God.

Never-

the less, God is said to be merciful metaphorically because the

44 The attribution ot passions to God in a metaphorical tashing i8 tound in the Sumaa Contra aentile., I, 91, (ad
tIn•• ).

eftect ot God'. goodnes8 i8 similar to the ettect 01' mercy or
compassion in man.

The campas8ionate man strives to drive away

the evil which is atflicting 8omeone else.

God's goodne8s and

liberality have the same ettect. 45
This discussion has clarified somewh.atithe notion 01'
sadness.
clear.

The definition of dolor and tristitia should now be
Sadness i8 a passion 01' the soul consisting in a shrink-

Ing ot the .ense appetite in the presence 01' evil and entailing
a constriction ot the heart.

--

45 S.T •• I, 21, 3

e.

OHAPTER III
CAUSES, EFFECTS, AJlD
REMEDIES OF' SADNESS

Th•••••nc. ot sadn.ss has now b••n giv.n,
damental questiona remain conc.rning sadness.
ness'

What tollows tram aadness'

O~her

tun-

What cauaes sad-

How oan sadn.ss b. re.edied'

Thi. chapter will tP,7 to anawer thes. basic question••
A. has been .een, there are two important factors in

anr passion. Without an obJ.ct to seek, the subject cannot experience a pa.slon.

Without a subject to seek it, a good will

not produce a pa.sion.

A passion n.ed. both a subj.ot and an ob-

J.ct in ord.r to exist.

When the search tor the cause ot sadne.s

la b.gun, both the subject and the object must be in.pected,
First w••hall consider the object.
salit7 doe. it .xert in producing a paSSion,
called an .tticient cause'
teet.

What type ot cauCould the object be

An etficient cause produce. the et-

Since there is no paSSion or emotion without an object and

alv.,. one one. an object has been pre.ented. the object doe.
produce the ertect and can be considered as an etrieient cause. 1
I

--

De Ver.,

2S, 1 c (prin.).
S6
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Thia hold. tl"Ue even though that whioh 1. pl'oduoed 1. not an external pbJs10al realIty but an immanent opel'ation.
Moreover, anrthing whioh oauaes the objeot ot aadneaa
i. It.elf al.o an etticlent caule.

Since the object ia a cause at

aadne •• , any external agent which exerta any type ot cau.ality on
the object indireotly causea the passion.
l'eaaon tor thi..

ot natural thlnga.

Thomas tell. us the

The object. ot the pa•• ion. are lIke the torma
SInce whatever cause. the torm of a thing

cau.e. the thing It •• lt, whatevel' oause. the objeot ot a pa•• ion
cau.e. the passlon. 2 St. Thomal .tate. that th1. i. why st. Augustine sa.,. that a powel" gl"eater than the 80ul i8 the cau.e ot ..
pa8.ion.)

Batura1ly, the appetIte does not want the evIl w1th

whioh it i8 in contact.

That whioh ia contl'a17 to the tendencT

ot the aubject doe. not beoame united to it exoept through the
action ot a greater power .ince the subject doe. not reach out

tor tbat wbich i8 repusnant to it.

Only an extrinsic agent would

2 S.T., I-II, 43, 1 c. "aespondeo dlcendum quod objeota pas.ionum-animae ae habent ad eas tamqua. to~e ad l'e. naturales vel &1'tltloia1e8: quia passlone. animae speclam l'ecipiunt
ab object18, .iout I"e. praedicta. a auia tormia. 8icut 191tU1'
quidquid eat causa forma., est cauaa reI constitutae pel' !p.am,
Ita etiam quidquid, et quocumque modo, est causa object1, e.t
causa passionia."
l De Batura Boni Oontra Hanlehaeoa, I, 20, contained
1n patroloi1ae-ti£Inae ~ua Completus, Vol. 42, $$1 a. "In
antma ergo doXorem raclE senaus reslatens pote.tatl majorl: In
corpore dolorem tacIt sensua reslstens oorporl potenttor!."
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br1ng an ev1l object into oontact with the sUbJeot.

On the other

band, 1t the subject did not resist the actlon ot the greater

power. Join1ng the object to the 8ubjeot would not cause sadness.
It the subject wanted to be atfected by
delight would tollow.

t~

greater power, only

It a 70unS boy were enjoylng h1mself, he

would not 11ke belng oarried t

0

bed.

However. it the young boy

did not mind be1ng taken to bed, he would not be glum but Joytul. 4 Theretore, a oause greater than the resisting soul 1s the
etficient cause ot a pass1on, too.
Can the object alao be considered a8 the tormal cause,
The sense appetite is in the soul a8 a determInation ot the soul
in regard to an operat10n, and there tore with reterence to the
soul is a torm and an act.
enoe to ita operation.

It 1a, however, a potency wIth reter

It becomes the subject ot the operation,

and thua i8 a mater1al cause 1n thi. relationship.

And even

prior to the operatIon it muat receive, through the apprehensive
powers, the determination ot the object.

Thus the apprehended

objeot tormally apecifie. the power and has the role ot tOPmal
cause, and the power (the .en.e appetite) has the role ot material cau.e.
Thua the object can be considered aa a tormal oause a.
well as an ettioient oause.

4

Se.

Is the Object alao a tinal cause?

a.T., I-II. 36, 4.
--

sadness has been de tined as the shrinking ot the sense appetite
in the presence ot ev1l.
no reason to be sad.

Obviously, without ev1l there would be

The appetIte would not reject and retuse

the object unless it were evil.
ev11 1s present, man 1s sad.
sad.

Experience tells us that when

When no evil 1a present, man is not

As the evil becomes greater, the sadness becomes greater. 5

this causality ne.ds further eluoidation.

These tests ahow that evil 1s a cause ot sadness.

The nature ot

When the object of a passion is a go04, there 1s no
ditficulty in seeing that the object is a tinal cause of the passion.

It is for the sake ot the good that something comes into

being or that an agent is moved.

Since the good is the object ot

the appetite, it is obvious that the object is a final cause of
the movement of the appetit •• 6

Evil, however, Is a prlvationJ 7

and although the privation is an actual fact, the evll itself baa

no positive being, but is only conceived as suoh by the m.1nd.,,8

How can .vil perfect the appetite or be a tinal cause'
••eks evll as such.
cause of sadness.

Experience has testified that evil is a
Nevertheless, when t he nature ot this cause Is

5 Por the latter see S.T., III, 46, 6
sent., IS, 2, ), ).
- -

-

6
7

8

S.T., I, 5, 4.
-Ibid., 48, ).

-IbId., 48, 2 ad 2. I-II, )6, 1 o.

-

NothIng

OJ also In III

-
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examined, it seems to lose 1ts power to oause.

Thomas tells us

that evil does not cause anything of itself but only b7 reason
the good which aocompanies the evil.
good which accompanies it.

9

or

Ho man seeks evil but the

This does not answer the present dlt

t1cult7. however, 81noe the object ot sadness 1s precisely the
evll which accompanies the good, not the good which acoompanie.
the eVil.

In reality a being exists which is good but not as

good aa it ought to be.

The goodness ot this being 1s not the

ob3eot ot sadness, tor goodness causes Joy.

It ia preCisely the

evil which 1s joined with the good which is the object and oau.e
10
ot aadness.
Yet how oan evil as suoh cause anything'
First. it la good to remember that, just as the object

ot appetite in general i8 not merely the good, but the apprehended good, so the objeot ot sadness 1s not Simply evil as it It
were a physical reality (tor evil has no physical reality) but

evil as apprehended.

It is not simply a physically existing

evil which is the object ot sadness but the apprehended evil.
It might be dittioult--lt would even be impossible--to explain
how a. real external evil

0

ould cause a real external poaitive

reality; but it i. not dlttlcult to see how an apprehended evil

4.
-Ibid., I-II, )6, 1 o.

9 S.T., I, 48, 1 ad
10

-
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can oauae a state or movement In the eoul whIch apprehends It.
EvIl borrows the notIon ot a tlnal cau.e trom tbe good
NothIng .eeks evil in It.elt, but the appetIte does .lutink from
evIl tor the same r ••son

t~t

the appetIte s.ek. the good. 11

Sinee the appetIte accepts the good, It must reject evIl.
appetIte did not seek the good, It would not be di.satlatled vI
evIl.

The object or aadneas, then, la reduoed to the genu. ot

tlnal cauae alnoe "oppo.lta aunt clroa Idem."12 Thi. holda true
even though the objeot ot sadness Is evIl.

Rather It i. booauso

tbe object Is evil tbat the appetIte roaota as It doe •• 13
Olearly, the object plaJs an important role in producIng a PIsS ion.
passIon.

But the subject Is also responsible tor the

It the sUbjoet were not a cause ot the passIon, the

sa.e object would produoe a unltorm passion In all subjeots.
ThIs 1. not the easo.

The more sensItIve the subject I., the

greater Is the sorrow or Sl'lot.

St. Thomas uses thIs taot to

prove that Ohrlst auttered more than &a7 other human beIng.

11

S.T., I, 63, 2 o.
-IbId., 17, 1 e, soe also In X Xet., la, n. 2122.

12
"Oontrarla sun~ e04e. genere."

-----

13 Se. S.!., I-II, 3S, 6 o. "Bonum, quod oat objeotum deleotationrs, propter s.lpsua appetitur: malum aute.,
quod eat obdectum trl.tltl.o, eat tuglendum Inquantum est prlvatl·o boni.
s •• alao In V ~., 1, n. 762. "Bonum enim quod
habot ratIone. tinis In prosequendo, etmalum In vitando In multIs sunt principIa co~ltlonis et motus, aieut In omnibus quae
aguntur propter tInea."

Ohrlst's powers ot peroeption were greater, and so the sorrow
whloh tollow.d that peroeption was sreater. 14
As has been atated, the object ot a passion la In some
re.pect Ita tlnal, ettlclent, and tormal cauae.
tite ot the 8ubject is the materlal cause.

Th. 8enae appe.

A materlal cause is

the subject, that In whioh a pertectlon is received. 1S O.rtainly, it is in the passlve pot.ncy ot the .ena. appetite tbat the
passion occurs thus maklng the aen.e ' appetlte the material cau.e
of sadn....

The subjective disposition ot tbe app.tite deter-

mines wh.ther or not the object will be a good or an evl1 in re.
lationshlp to the SUbject. 16
Thomaa oospares the caus.. ot a passion to the oau.e.

ot the natural appetite.

A lower place 1. the tlnal cause ot the

descent ot a heavy body, but the Inner princlple ot motion is
the Datural inclination downward.

The present evil i. the tinal

cau.e ot sadness, but the material cau.e ot a pas810n 18 the Inner incllnation ot the appetite.

14 !.1.,
15

Ibid.,
..........

It is because ot its natural

III, 46, 6 o.

lOS, S o •
I-II, 43. 1 c.

I,

16 Ibid.,
"Siout o_jectum deleotatloni. e.t bonum apparena oonveniens. conjUDotums ouju8 causa ettlcleDa .at illud quod taoit oonjunctionem, vel quod taoit oonvenienti.. vel bonitate., vel apparent lam huju.modi boni; causa
aute. per modum disposition1s materialia. est habitua, vel quae.
oumque dI8P08Itio 8eoundum quam tit alicu! conveniena aut apparens 1llud bonum quod eat .1 conjunctum."

6)
urge toward the good that the appetite rejects the evil which 1s
contra~

to the good.

For this reason, the tirst subjective

principle ot sadness is love.

Usually, the sense appetite has

been disposed to love oertain objectse

The .ens. appetite ot a

mother, tor example, bas been so disposed that she loves her 80n
very intenselJ'.

It is this love ot her son which is the pr1l'Bal'1

source ot all the mother's emotions concerning him.
griet at her sonts death can be taken as an example.
mother loves her 8on.

~m

A

motherts

First the

this love springs a hatred ot any-

thing whicb would separate her trom the object ot bel' love.
love is the cause ot hat •• 11
cause ot sadness.

Thus

Hate, in turn, i. the .econd inner

Througb hate a certain antipath7 is tormed be-

tween the object and the subject.

In the example, the mother ac-

quire. 1n her hate an intense repugnance tor the death ot her

son.

When the death actually occurs, sadne •• is the natural re-

sult.
Ooncupisoence i8 another inclination ot the sense appe
tite which oan be a cauae ot sorrow.

Concupiscence is the moye-

ment ot the appetite toward its proper object.

It a greater pow

er hinders the appetite trom reaching tnis object, .adne•• tollows.

A1l7thlng wh1ch militates against the natural JIlOvement ot

--

17 S.T., I-II, 29, 2 o.
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the appetite causes the appetite to dislike it.

Consequently,

concupisoence is a oause of sadness inasmuch a8 we grieve over a
dela7 in the enjoyment ot our desires or over their complete
trustration.

It a soldler on a troopshlp haa to walt a long

time tor his meals, he is sad.

But it no tood is lett because

the cook misjudged the amount needed, the sold1er's desires are
completely truatrated; and the sadness Is greater.

St. Augustine

had said that concupiscenoe was the universal oause of sorrow,
but st. Thomas expla1ns that this is impossible.

Concupisoence

looks to a tuture good which 1s not yet possessed.

Sadne.s can

also be caused by the removal ot pleasures which we are already
enjoying.

Thomas explains the senae in whioh

st.

Augustine

meant that conoupisoence is the universal cause ot sadness.
quently AUgllSt:1.ne u.ed ooncup1scence to mean love.

Fre

When concu-

piscence is equivalent to love, thzeQ concupiscence can be understood as the universal cause ot aadness. 18
The subjeot.s love tor an object is its desire to be

united to that object.

The appetite naturally wants to be uni-

ted w1th those objects that pertect 1ts nature.

For the same

reason, the appetite wants to be separated tram the things which
are oontrary to its pertectlon.

aneness, 11ke goodness, 1s just

18 For Thomas' treatment ot tneae subjective causes
at sadness aee S.T., I-II, 36, 2.

--
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another aspeot ot the ooncept ot being.

Since the subject seeka

goodness, it naturally seeks unity, ita own unity as a being and
its union with other beings that can perteot It.

When this de-

sire tor unity is truatrated, sadne.s tollows. The subject's
oraving tor unity is another cause of sorrow. 19
When the passion 1s taken as a composite act at body
and soul, the faculty and Its subjective dispositIon are considered as the materIal cause and the object is taken as the tinal,
ettiolent, and tormal cause.

However, within the operation ot

the .ense appetite itselt, another serie. ot oauses can be disoemed.

Sadness consists in a shrinking of the sense appetite

and a constriction ot the heart.

Within thIs operation ot the

composite, the arrective state at the soul 18 the formal [aspect,
and therefore a sort of formal cause at sadness; the bodily
change i8 the material aspeot, and theretore a sort ot material
cause of the passion.

20

The oonstriction ot the heart

~eo.lves

ita determination from the shrinking ot the sense appetlte.

It

18 the shrinking ot the sense appetite whioh speoifies the type

ot concomitant bodlly ohange. The attectlve state of anger, tor
example, would not cause a oonstriction ot the heart but a heating ot the blood near the heart.

19
20

-

-

Ibld •• 37, 4 c.

The bodll1 changes dlffer be-
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cause they prepare a man to meet each situation properly.
Within the operation ot the passion, the attective
state ot the soul can also be considered aa the etticient cause

ot the b04ily change.

21

True, the appet1te is passive in re-

spect to the objectJ but atter it baa been moved by tbeobject,
it can in turn caua. the body to react in the manner whioh 1s
22
most helpful and titting in this particular aituation.
!he ettecta ot sadne •• will give ua a olearer insight
into tha nature ot sadnesa and its importanoe.
tacta ot sadness baa alr.adJ been treated.

One ot the et-

The oonstriotion ot

the heart is an easential ingredient in the detinition ot sadneaa according to st. Thomas.

Since the heart ia the principle

ot motion in the body, thia oonstriction impedes the vital motion whioh tlows from the heart to the other members ot the bodJ.

Aa this movement becomes sluggish, all voluntary movement

ot the body becomes more diftioult.

For this reason st. Thomas

says that sadness harms the body more than all1' other passion.
Other passiona can beoome excesslve and increase the vital mot10n beyond measure.
ture.

Sadness weakens the body ot 1 ts very na-

Other passlons have a bodily Cbange, but their bodily

change 1s in harmony with the vltal movement trom the heart.

21
22

S.T., I, 20, 1 ad 1.
--Ibid., I, 80, 2 o.

As
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long as the passion is a normal pass lon, other passions actually
help the body.

But tear, despair, and e.pecially aadnea. injure

the body ot their very nature even though the emotions are not
excessive.

Aristotle s.,. that anger and concupiscence have

made some people insane.
tear?

Can sadness be worse than anger or

Thomas insiats that tear and anger injure the body chiet.

17 because ot the admixture of sadness in these emot1ons.

It 1s

the ab••nce ot the d•• ired object that leads to tear and anger.
Moreover, other amotions have no monopoly on the business ot making persons insane.

Sadness causes many people to tall into .el-

anoholy and insanity.2)
St. Thomas t prodigious number or works

and

his vast

knowledge of other authors testIfy to the Angelic Doctor's great
love ot learning.
~iscus.lng

It is no surprise, then, to rind St. Thomas

the ertects ot sadness on learning betore he investi-

gates anT other ettect.

All the powers ot the soul flow trom the

e.sence ot the soul and have their wellspring there.

The many

powers ot the soul inhere in one essence, and they function together in an orderly manner.

When the .oul becomes thoroughly

engrossed in the operation ot one potencT, it cannot attend to
the operation ot another potency.

The soul i. one, and it can

23 st. Thomas explains the.8 harmful errects ot sadne •• in S.T •• I-II. 31, 4.

--
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tooua Ita attentlon on only one object at a tlme.

Obvloua17,

.e~

.1ble grlef attecta the .oul quite keen1y and occuple. mo.t I t
not allot the latterta attentlon.

When a man 1. learning aome-

thlng new, great ettort and applloatlon are required.
quentl"

Con.e-

• contllct arl.e. 11'1 whioh .adn... 1. the vlctor and

learnlng the lo.er.

Sometl••• the grlet beccae ••0 Intens. that

a man cannot even retlect upon aatter h. has alre.d, learned.
St. Thoma. polnta out that thl. preoccupatlon ot tbe
soul wlth aadne •• wl11 have varylng degreea ot aucce •• wlth dltterent men.

Sadne •• wlll not get the better ot .en who have a

gre.t love ot learnlng.

Men who love the Intellectual 11te wlll

be able to 81 ve thelr a-ttentlon to learnlng more ea.l1y and wll1
not be dl.tracted .s ea81ly b7 thelr .orrow.
Inten.e .enaible pleaaure dl.traot. the aoul trom the
h1gher operation ot learning.

It the .adne•• ia moderate, 1t

can dimini.h .enalble pleaaure and aocldentally help the cause ot
mowledse rather than hinder 1t.

ot It.ell', however, .adnea.

pede. learning, and to a greater extent than .enaible pleaaure
doe..

'l'here ia one way 11'1 which a aoderate .adne•• might help

learn1ng.

It a aan beoome. aad enough, he might undertake the

dlscipllne nece.sary tor knowledge In the hope that through
learnlng he could be tree ot hi •• adne...

This 1. e.peclall,

true ot .en who turn to the, .tud1 ot God to obtain peace tor

im-
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their restless souls.

24

Thomas tells us that the ettects ot the passions are
so.etimes named metaphorioally aocording to their similarity to
the moyements of senslole bodles.

Warmth 1s attributed to love;

expansion to joy; and oonstriction to sadness.

A man is said to

be weighed down by sorrow because his proper movements are impeded 1n the same way as a man would be whose movements are hindered
by a heavy burden.

S1.milarly, an evil obJeot weighs down the

soul because eyil prevents the soul from enjoying its proper object.

It the sub ject does not lose hope. there is a movement to

drive out the sadness.

When hope goes and anxiety sets in, even

the inner operations ot the soul cease; and the soul cannot escape no matter where it turns.

When torpor encampasses the suo-

ject. the external moyementa at the body become sluggish.
beenseen, sometimes eyen the power to apeak is lost.

As haa

Sometimes

the anguish ot soul becomes so extreme that a man becomes constricted and imprisoned Within himself.

The sorrow weighs down

the soul so completely that the man withdraws inside himself and
almost lo•• s contact with the external world.

2S

Sadnesa ••ems paralyzing. enough to slow down any oper-

24 The deleterious ettecta or sadneaa on the learning
process are described in A-l-, I-II, 37, 1.
25 The ertects
S.T., I-II, 37, a.

--

or

aadness on the soul Is tound 1n
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ation.

In a certain sense this is true.

The pre.ent evil which

ia the object of tristitla impedes the proper act
tion.

o~

any opera-

If the act whioh we are performing is distastefUl

we never do it

as

well as acts whioh are pleasant.

the appetite cause the acts of man.

~o

us,

The "Ml.ll and

When the subject sees an

evil in the object ot the act, the appetite does not tend toward
the object as vigorously

8S

it otherwise would.

When the cauae

ot human acts and operations becomes less active, the acta themaelvas ara considerably weakened.

Ordinarily, no boy oleans out

the basement with as muoh zest as he plays a game.

Bo student

studies subjeots he does not 11ke with as muoh eagerness as he
studles his favorIte field.

In another sense, however, sadness

doa. not restrict manta activity but rather increases it.

Tbe

sUbJect's sorrowful reaction to the present evil causes the subjeot to strive more earnestly to rid himself ot the evil and the
sadneas which follows It.
moneY'. he is sad.

When a man's business begins to lose

But his ve1!7 sadness makes the man busy him..

• elf more zealously to get his business running smoothly agaln.
At the aame time_ hi. sadness stops the man from making the same
mi.take. he had been making.

26

Clearly, aadne •• has many harmful eftecta •• peelallT

-

26 S•• S.T., I-II, 37, 3.
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when it is excessive.

A

.auld be quite valuable.

knowledge of the remedies for sadness
St. Thomas not only giv.s us this prac-

tical advice but the reasons wh3 the rem.cUes assuage the grief.

Thus Thomas' treatment 1s speculative as well as practical. In
general,. the remedy for sadness is the latter's oppo8ite,

deligb~

Delight 1s a certain restful relishing ot the appetite in the
pOlsession of its proper object.

Sadness is just the opposite,

as it 1s a restless discontent in the tace ot evil.

Delight has

the same relationship to sadness as rest haa to fatigue.
brings a certain fatigue or sickness to the appetite.

Sadness

As any

rest for the body relieves any bodily fatigue, so any delight
lessens any sadness whatsoever no matter what the source ot the
sadness is.

The body can become tired in

w1ll always cure the tiredness.

manr

ways, but rest

Many things can cau.e the appe-

tite to be sad, but joy will alw&J. dispel the sadne.s since joy
1. the latter'. contrary.

It the appetite is resting in an ob-

ject and rellshing lt, it cannot be restl••• and discontent with
another object at the same time.

When there 1s a conflict be-

tween j01 and sadness, one must win out; for there i8 only one
s.na1ble appetite in

~

one animal.

2.7

Sadness is an act of the composite.

Senaualltas doe.

not inhere in the soul alone but in aoul and body_

2.7

--

See S.T., I-II, 38, 1.

When aenaible
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appreh.~ion

has a delightful

object betore it, delight tollows

in the soul and pushes out any sadness which,might be there.
constriction of the heart would be relieved, too.

In this way,

d.light tirst comes to the soul and .econdly to the body.
process oan be rever••d.
bringing joy to the soul.

The

The

The body cen be refresh.d tirst thu.
St. Thomas believe. that tn. general

well-being ot tb. bodJ ov.rtlows to the heart and reliev•• ita
oon.triotion.

When anJ oorporal remedy re.tor.. the body and the

heart to their normal .tate, the vital motion from the heart re-

sumes, and the sadne.s o.a.... The bodily change i. part ot the
pa.sion.

Since the bodil1 part of sadne •• 1. no longer present,

the sadne.s is no longer present.
it. parts.

There can be no whole without

Moreover, bodily r ...dies are pleasant to the sense.

and cause delight to tbe .ensible appetite in the soul.

It is

not ditticult to see, then, how bodily pleasur•• mitigate sorrow.
ThOMas cite. sleep and baths .a good remedie. tor sadness becau.e
they restore the vital motion trom the heart and delight the sen
28

••••

st. Thoma. has stated that sadne •• 1. an ob.tacle to
knowl.dge.

»ow he assert. that contemplation of the truth can

overoome the evil ettects ot sadne.. and even le •• en the pa •• ion
It a man i. able to tight his sadne.s and contem.plate God and hi

--

28 Se. S.T., I-II, 38, S.
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tu.tw.-e 'beatitude, his sorrow can 'be turned into 307.

Contempla-

tion ot divine things brings the greatest j07 to man because Intellection Is hi. higbe.t power and God i8 the most pertect 0'0jeot ot this potencf.

29 !he greater

a man'. love

greater will be hi. reliet trom his sadness.

ot wisdom, the

The martyx*s testi-

tJ to this power ot conte.plation when they rejoice in their suttering..

!he pursuit ot knowledge can cause sadness becau.e of

its dlffioulty. manr things that man discovers to be true vill
be repugnant to his vill, but contemplation ot itself causes the
keenest delight.

The Jor which accompanies the proper

exerci~e

ot the intellect is in the intellectual appetite. Howevep, there
i. a certain overflow in the povers of the soul fro. a higher to
a lower and vice ver.a.

In this wa1 the j01 in the intellectual
.30
appetite can l.s ••n the .orrow In the s.nsible appetit ••
The compassion ot friends i8 another remedJ tor .ad-

n....

When a person •••• others are grieving at hi. plight, he

t.el. he is not carr,ring the burd.n all by htmaelt.
hi. tJtiead. t compassion prove their love

tOf!

him.

Moreov.r,
This know-

ledge brinp deliaht vhiOh automaticall., assuages hi. sorrov •.3l
latere.tingl,. enough, st. Thomas .tate. that the t.ar.

--

29 S.T., I-II, ), 5.
.30

Ibid., )8, 4 •

-

.31 Ibid., )8, 3.

14
and groans of the mourner alleviate his sorrow.

Every e.vil be ...

comes greater when it is ahut up inside the soul where the soul
can continually reflect on it.

The tears and cries of the weeper

torce the sorrow to the surtace, and the interior grief is lessened as the soul is distracted by

exterio~

things.

For this

reason, any exterior manlt9station or sorrow tends to mitIgate
Besidea, weeping is the proper act ot a person who is af-

it.

tlicted by some misrortune.

Every act which is in accordance

with the sUbJect's nature is accompanied by delight.
cours., always disperaes the gloom.
pona against evil.

Dellgbt, ot

Sadness is one of manta wea-

As long as the normal reaction to evil is not

abused, the tears characteristic ot sorrow will lead to joy-

32

To sum up, both the object and the aubject cauae aa4ne.s.
and

The evil object is in some respect the tinal, etricient,

formal cause; the subjective disposition ot the appetite,ia

the material cause.

Within the operation itself, the atrective

state ot aadness ia in a aena. the efficient and formal cause,
the constriction ot the h.art can be considered as the material
cau.e.
dy.

Sadness is the mo.t harmful passion to both Boul and bo-

Neverthel.sa, moderate sadness can be very beneticial in

fighting .vil.

In general, anJ delight, bodily or intellectual,

will relieve aadn••••

--

32 S.T., I-II, 38, 2.

CHAPTER IV
'I'HE GOODNESS AND KALICE
OF SADNESS

The plcbne.s or doctrine tound in the Summa fhaologiaa
i. organised around the truth that God is the tlpst cause and
laat end ot all creatures.

All human act. are studied because

aome ot these act. lead man toward his last end and 80me do not.
The ppeviou8 chapter. have ahown what sadnes. i8; this chaptep
will point out when sadne.s leads man to hi. la.t end and when
sadne.s hindera man in hia JOW'll.,.. toward God.
The passlona a8 such cannot strictl,.. be called human
acta.

Only tho.e act. whlch are proper to man a8 such oan be

called human.

ot materlal being., man alone 1. master ot hi. own

aots; man alone oan use intelleot and tree wl11 in hi. actions.
But the pasSions are common to Doth man and brut...
Thomas conslder the goodne.. and malioe

or

--

2

Ibld., 6, 1 c.
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How can St.

a pa•• lon, ainee a

pa8.10n 1s not a human aot but an act ot man?

1 S.T., I-II, 1, c.

2

1

Only those act.
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whlch proceed trom reason can be called good or bad moral11.)
Thomas answera that the passlona are good or bad morally inasmuch
as they are oontrolled by the 1ntellect and will.

The wlll has

despotic control over an external member such as an arm.

Al-

though the will doe. not enjoy .uch complete control over the
passions, the will does have "political" control over them. 4
The w1ll rules the pass10ns in two ways, either by commanding the
emotions directly or by not checking them once they have been
aroused,' Thomas campares the indirect control of the will over
the emotions to a captain t s management of a ship.

A captain do••

not sink his ship d1rectly, but through oarelessness the captain
can allow the ship to be Sunk. 6 As the f1rst mover of mants act~
the will oan oontrol the passions by forcing the lower powers to
act rationally.

Thus reason can evaluate the sl tuation properly

and put the correct picture of the matter before the sense appetite through the mediation of the imagination.

By controlling
7
his imagination, a person can control his emotions.
Thomas also distinguishes between antecedent paSSion

--

3 S.T., I-II, 18,
4 Ibld" 58, 2 c.

S
6

S c.

Ibid., 24, 1 cJ De Ver., 25, 4 c.
--S.T.,
I-II, 6, 3 o.

--

--

7 De Ver.,

2S, 4 c.
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and consequent passlon.

Antecedent passion sometimes clouds and

obtuscates the reasoning processes.

When man acts on first im-

pulse betore reason enter. in, he is not acting properly as a man
and thus hi8 act cannot be morall,. good or bad.

In an,. ca.e, an-

tecedent passion would-diminish the merit or the guilt of an act~
Consequent passion ~ Call. take place in two wals.

Sometimes the

wll1 can be so intensely moved toward an objeot taat the movement
tlows overo Into the sensitlve appetite. 9 At otaer time., a man '
can judge that a certain passion is prooper and freely encourage

an emotion which is ri8i.ng up within him..

In either case, the

harmonious concurrence ot the lower appetite with the hIgher ap10
petite would increa.e the goodness or mallce ot the act.
There are two more way. in which a passlon can be good
or evl1 morally.

The passions can have moral implications 1t

they are considered

a8

the objeot of the will.

passion can also be voluntary in cause.

11

Moreover, a

At times intense anger

or love can completely take away the use of reason a.nd cause tem-

8 De Ver., 2$,5 c. In his earller work St. Thomas
makes no dl.tlnciTOn here between antecedent and consequent passlon. Nevertheless, he doe. state, that paSSion would lessen the
moral imputabIlIty of the act.
9
10

11

c.
-S.T., I-II, 24, 3
De Ver., 26, 6

-De-V.r., 26, 6 c. ad 1.
--
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pOI'&ry" Insanlt,._

Even this aot could be mor-ally evil if the per-

son had willingly allowed himself to reach the stage where he
would be blinded by passion.

And as. long as the passion does not

completely prevent the use ot reason, 80me guilt would be present
12
in the act itselt.
Since a passion can be good or evil morally, sadness
must be examined to determine its moral goodness

01'

malice.

Tho-

mas makes repeated mention of the Stoics, who thought that sadness was always evil.

According to the stoics a man grievea on-

ly over evil which has betallen him.
tue or moral good.
to man.

But mants only good is vlr-

A bodily good is not a good which is propel'

Sinoe the Stoics admitted only moral good

01'

eVil, the

wlse and virtuous man should never be sad because he avolds the
only real evil, aoral evil.

Once the Stoics judged that sadne ••

was not useful, they were logical in concludIng that sadneas waa
irrational and to be avoided completely.13
one ot the

chIe~soU1'ees

Thomas points out

ot their dIfficulty.

The Stoicadid not

distingulsh between senae knowledge and intellectual knowledge
and consequently dld not
intelleotual appetite.

--

the sensitlve appetite

.epa~ate

t~am

Since a paaslon doe. not tollow upon rea-

12 S.T •• I-II, 71, 1.
1) Ibld.,
De Ver., 26, 8 ad 9.

--

--

the

S9. 3,

III,

15, 6

14 S.T., I-II, 24. 2 c.

ad

2, III,

46,

6 ad 2,
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son, a passion 1s irrational and eVll. l4 ~hus to the Stoics the
.erlt

or

even a morally good act 1s dtm1n1shed If an admlxture
l
ot passion 18 allowed to enter in. $
Thomas asserts that the Stoles are wrong.

True, moral

good i, mants greatest good; but man la a composite ot body and
soul.

A bod1ly good 1s a real good to man, and its contrary 1s

a real evil.

As long as the passion 1s moderate and reasonable,

aadne.s can be a virtue.

Moreover, no man 1s

never commits even a slight fault.

80

upright that he

And when a man does commit

It his fault made no
d1fterence to him, he would soon do the same thing over again. 16
80me moral ev1l, he should be sad about it.

Thomas also contends with the Stoic assertion that the
passlons are not controlled by the intellect.

Everyone admit.

that an extemal member suoh a.s an arm can be commanded by our
higher powers.

It a. man resolves to perform a corporal work ot

mercy, the interior act of his will 1s meritorious.
commandIng his ar.ms and legs to

perto~

man makea this act more meritorious.

However, b7

the d.ed exteriorly, a

Oorrespondingly, the move-

menta ot the passions in themselves are not moral act.; but when
man t • higher powers encourage a pas8ion or rlow OYer into the

--

14 S.T., I-II, 24, 2
1$

16

.3 c.
-Ibid.,
-Ibld., $9, .3 c.

o.
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sensltlve appetlte, the passlon actual11 helps man to pursue a
good or avo14 an evl1 and consequentl,. can add to the lI1erl t of
an aot. 11
St. Thoma. hiluelt hold. that aadneas oan be elther
morally good or morally evl1 dependlng upon the object ot the
passlon and it. Intenalt,.

Ia It •• lf, sadne •• 1. an evl1 lnasmuch .s It prevents
18

the aen.itlve appetlte trom restlng In the good.
oonoern, however, ls about moral evl1.

n... 1. perver.e 1t the .ubjeot
go04.

19

The pre.ent

In the tlrst place, aad-

i. sa4 about what 1. real11 a

Sadne •• can alao be evl1 It It ls allowed to become

Immoderate that It immobillze. tbe aoul.

80

20

There are two apeo1e. ot sadne•• whlch are alwa1s evl1.

on.

ot the •• 1. sloth (acedla); the other ls envy (lnv1dla).

Both ot th••• are oppo ••d to the joy whlch re.ulta from oharlty.
Sloth 1. opposed to the joy wh10h man should have 1n d1vine
thins., .nVJ 1. oppo.ed to tbe joy which man shou.ld have 1n the
good tortune ot others.

--

17 S.T., I-II, 24, 3 c.
18

Ibid. , )9, 1 c.

19 Ibld., 39,
20

2 ad 2.

-IbId., 39, 3 ad 1.
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Sloth i8 8adne •• over
should

~ejoice.

ettect.

~e

dIvine good in whioh charit7

Sloth is alwa,.8 evil, either in it.elf or in It.

When a man take. pleasure in what i. an apparent good

but really evil, bls pleaaure ls perver8e.

On

tbe other band, to

be sad about an apparent evil whioh i. really a good i8 just as
perverse.

Sinoe a splritual gpod is a real good, to be sad about

the dlvine lood 18 evl1 in It.elt.
cause Ita object 1s a good.

Here tbe sadness 1. evl1 be-

Sloth can also be evl1 1n 1ts ettect.

It hls dlsgust with God is inteDse enough, a man will deaist trom
good works.

Thus sloth can be evil In two waya, In 1taelf or in

1ts ertect.

Sinoe torpor toward spiritual tnings i. dlreotly op-

posed to the joy tbat tollows love of God, sloth 1. a serious aberration ot the appetite when oonsented to.
Thoma. conslders sloth to be a capltal vlce, a vloe
whloh ls the .ource of other evl1 aota.

Thia apeole. of sadne ••

leade to despalr, oOWardlines8, dissuet wlth dlvine law, and a
oraving for illlolt senee pleasures.

Sadneas will cause a man

to do almost anything to relleve hiaself of h1a mise17.
can 11ve without 80me pleasure.

No man

If a man tinds no de11gbt In

spiritual things, he will soon turn . to 111ioit sensual delights.
Atter treating sloth, whloh 18 8adnesa in the dlvine

--

21 The treatment ot sloth ls baaed on S.T., II-II,

35.
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go04, Thomas turn. to enV7$ which Is .adness In the good rortune

ot other men.
haa evll

&8

There are dlfterent type. of env7.

Its object.

Sadness alway.

In enY,f$ the object of the passIon 1s

the good ot another, but that good cons1dered as one's own evll~
It & person ls sad about the rise ot another beoause he fears
that other person will harm him, he Is not experlencing envy a.
such.

Hl. e.otlon i. stmply a result ot tear and is had wlthout

guilt.

A person can also be sad about the good ot another, not

because he begrudges the other his good, but because he is lacking the good whioh the other posses.e..

It a man is zealous tor

the virtue at another, hla emotlon 18 not on17 without gul1t but
qui te prad.ewortl'q.

As long aa he doe. not begrudge the other

person'a possession of temporal good., a man can be zealous tor
material goods, too, It hl. pa.slon ls moderate.

Properly spe&k-

ins. hovever, envy 1s sadne.s over the good ot another inasmuch
as the other ls excelling him and lessening hls own glory and
honor.

This type of en"7, which Is en.,. properly speaking, 1.

alway8 perverse b.caus. a man 18 grleving over the good ot another, in which he should rejolce.
Like sloth, envy 1s a cap1tal vlce, a vice which Is the
80urce ot other aberration. ot the will.

22

-In I -Het.,

3, n. 63.

An

envious man is so
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sorrowful over the good ot another that he wlll try any meana to
deprive another ot h1s prosper1ty.

Thua envr leads to calumD1,

detraction, Joy at another's mistortune. or griet at another's
prosperity.

Envy tinally develops into bate itselt.

23

Sadness can thua be a aerioua moral evil.
can al.o be good.

But sadness

Inasmuch as sadneas prevents the repose ot the

appetite in the good, it 1s an ev11.

However, since according to

the dispo.ition ot d1vlne prov1dence man must encounter ev11,
aadnea. 1. a go04 because It ls a weapon agalnst evl1.

Anrone

who would not grleve In the tace ot evl1 elther would not know
that the evl1 exi.ted or would not realize that It waa harmful to
htm.

In either case, this lack ot knowledge would be an imper-

tection.

Once the presence ot ev11 ls suppo.ed, It is good to

know about it and to reject 1t.

No one wants to be sad.

But

onoe ev11 1s admitted as a tact, a person ahould know about it
and react against it.

The knowledge ot evil can be had through

the right use ot reason.
evl1.

And a well-disposed wl11 a1v87s reject.

Since a moral good Is had when there 18 rectltude at Intel

leot andvl11, sadne •• can be a moral good aa long aa the object

ot the sadness is evl1 and the paaalon Is moderate. 24

23 The treatment ot enV,1 is baaed on

--

24 S.T., I-II, 39. 10 and 2 c.

~.!.,

II-II, )6.
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st. Thomas makes a d1stinct10n which explains further
how aada.sa can

be

useful.

The presence of evil gives rise to

two movement a ot the sense appetite.

The first movement of aad-

ness ia not useful because the ev11 ia preaent and a tact.

The

evil cannot be present and not be present at the same time.

The

aecond move.ent ot the appetite tlees and rejects the evIl which
ia causing the sadness.

Sadness over moral evil is useful be-

cause tbPough it man Is induced to avoid it.

Just as the ooncom-

itant pleaaure helps man,to seek the good, so the concomitant
sadne.s helps man to tle. what is evil.

It the sadness ia immo-

derate, naturallT it will immobilize all operations; but rational
aadnesa will alwaT8 make one tl.e evil more readi17.2S
As haa been seen, aadnes8 has no goodnesa or malioe In
1tselt 8ince it la a movement ot the lower appet'i te and not ot
the intellect and wIll.

However, the will can command the lower

appetite alnce the,will does have political control over the paaslona.

In itselt, sadness i8 indifferent; It can be either mor-

allT good or morally evil.

There are two things which must be

avoIded to prevent the sadness trom being evIl.

In the first

place, the object ot the sadness must be a real ev11 and not Just
an apparent eVIl.

--

Secondly, the passion must not be immoderate.

25s.T., I-II, )9, 3.

8S
When these two condit1ons are verft1ed, sadness 1s a weapon g1ven
to us by God to' .t1ght against 1he ubiqu1tous pre.ence ot evil.

CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
The reader's gas. has been tocused upon a very common
experience in every per.on t • lite, the passion sadness.
has been held up to the lIght and turned thi. way and

t~t

every facet ot it haa been expo.ed to the reader's view.
knowledge has this philosophical retlection yielded1

Sadness
until.
What

Allot u.

already had immediate knowledge of .adnesa from our direct, per.onal contact with it.

How the reader enjo,.. a philosophical

knowledge because he knows .adne.. through it. cause., intrin.io
and extrinsic.
When the ••••nc. ot .orrow i8 examined, the intellect
di8cover8 that aadn.ss belong. to that unique cla.. ot being
which 1s called move.ent.

A gradual change with an accompanying

10•• ot a contrary torm is proper to materlal beinga; and sadneas
la a pas.lon properl,. sp.aking only because ot the ooncomitant
bodily change, the constrlction ot the heart and the general oesI

aation ot bodlly moyement.

But sadnes. al.o involves a movement-

though in a d1tterent .en.a--ot the Immaterial power which i. the
.enae appetite.

Sadne •• 1. an agitation ot thi. power, a move-

ment away trom the object ot the emotion.
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Sadne•• i. an aot or the sense powers.

It rollow.

senae cognition and 1. an operation ot the compo.ite ot body and
soul s1noe tbe constriction ot the heart i. an essential oon.t1tuent ot the act.

Sadne •• 1s app11ed to the rational appetite

only in a w1de .ense or metaphorlcally.

Th. rejection ot evil

b7 the will i8 81milar to the reactlon agalnst evl1 by the s.ns.

app.tlte; but the operat1on ot the will 18 ••••ntially independent ot any bodil1 change and tollow. Intellection, not ••n.e
cognition.
Sadne •• is to be dist1ngui.hed, too, trom the sense
coseition ot an evl1.

Sadn.ss tollows the apprehens10n ot ev11

but 1. distinct trom 1t.

Two baseball spectators may s1t 1n the

aame a tand. and watch the1r teams lose the .ame g.....
nition ot tbe tact is objective and identical.

Their cog

But the InteDait,

and duratlon ot eaoh one's reaction against the d.teatwould depend upon the indivldual'. interest in the team and his emotiona
.ensitivit,.
A passlon is so named because It 1. caused by an extrln.io asent, whioh in the oase ot sa4ne.s 1. evl1.
the subjeot Is also a oause ot the passion.

However,

Reactlons to the

same situation ma, ditter wid.ly depending upon the lov•• and
hates and emotional make-up ot the individual. atrected.

It is

.specially true ot the passions that ttamne quod racipitur, .ecun
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dum modum recipientis recipitur."

1

Thom.a treats ot sadnea. becauae it i. an act ot man,
an act which can help or hinder a person in the attainment ot
hi. tinal beatitude.

It i. useless, then, tor a peraon to be-

come so pre-occupied with the evil in the world that he beco. . a
immobilised and pbJalcally harmed by exceaaive aadneaa.
aadnea. deteats ita own purpose.

Extre.e

How can aadne •• help a person

tight evil--a. God intended it to do--it it renders a person unable to cope with the adver.e situation?
Becau.e ot the extre.e dangers to body and soul, sadne.s must be kept in hand.

A person does not have despotic con-

trol over his emotiona, but his will can turn the attention ot
the soul trom one object to another.

ot evil.

Sadnesa tollows coseltion

No realiat has much ditticulty discovering evil 1n the

world about h1m and in himselt, but a peraon would be just as
b11nd who did not se. the magniticence and wholesamenesa ot Godta
creation.

A pessimist who magnIties the evil around him is not

a well-balanced person.

It the purpose ot sadne.. is to be a-

chieved, a person's imagination and outlook on lite must be controlled.

SInce &nJ joy and pleasure mitigates sorrow, anyone

severely afflicted by

~iet

should also take care that he gets a

moderate amount ot Wholesome recreation.

--

1 S.T., I, 7$, $ c.
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By controlling his apprehensive powers, a person can

moderate the intenslty and durat10n of h1s sadness.
Je.et 1s a cause of the passlon as well as the objeot.

d1vldual must develop a well-balanced
make-up.

and

But the subEach 1n-

integrated emotional

An extremely sensltive set ot emotions is as trouble-

some as a vePJ dull and phlegmatic temperament is useless.
Sinoe sadness is a weapon against evil, lt 18 not to be
entirely suppressed.

Just as man ne.ds joy to help him

p~sue

the good, so he needs sadness to help him tlee evil and thus
reach hi. everlasting beatitude, where God will wipe away all
tears.
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